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GIRARDEAU A. SPANNt
Introduction
The task of the federal judiciary is seriously complicated by the
fact that it has to play one role while pretending to play another. We
ask the courts to pretend that they are resolving disputes between par-
ties, but what we really want them to do is tell us how to conform our
behavior to our fundamental values. Society needs a branch of govern-
ment to implement its fundamental values, and the federal judiciary is
well suited to that task because it possesses the precise balance of au-
tonomy and public accountability needed to perform the function
properly.
However, the dispute resolution charade is counterproductive. It
frustrates proper implementation of our values by diverting judicial en-
ergies to consideration of extraneous, dispute-related concerns. Accord-
ingly, courts should adopt a new model of adjudication more in tune
with their important social function.
Under the traditional, dispute-resolution model of adjudication,
courts are expected to decide cases by ascertaining the material facts
and applying to those facts general principles of law. In theory, such a
process promotes unbiased decisionmaking which will be perceived by
the parties as legitimate, but it also results in the exposition of legal
principles as they are applied to more and more different factual situa-
tions. Nevertheless, under the traditional model, exposition is merely an
incidental consequence of the process of principled decisionmaking; dis-
pute resolution is viewed as the primary objective.
An alternative model of adjudication can be fashioned under which
the exposition that occurs during the adjudicatory process constitutes
the primary functions of courts-at least article III courts. Such a
model assigns to the courts a social role that is far more important than
*0 Girardeau A. Spann 1982. All rights reserved. Permission to reprint this article must be
obtained directly from the author.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown University. A.B. 1971, Princeton University, J.D.
1974, Harvard University. I would like to thank the people who helped me to develop and express
the ideas contained in this article, including Chuck Abernathy, Abe Chayes, Dick Chused, Linda
Donaldson, Frank Flegal, Deirdre Golash, Steve Goldberg, Steve Jenkins, Duncan Kennedy,
Victor Kramer, Alan Morrison, Linda Rodd, Mike Seidman, Angelyn Spaulding, Mark Tushnet
and Si Wasserstrom. Research for this article was supported by a writer's grant from the
Georgetown University Law Center.
(585)
586 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:585
the role contemplated by the dispute-resolution model. When statutes
are involved, exposition provides useful information to the executive
and the legislature. This information facilitates proper operation of the
legislative process in a way that is consistent with separation-of-powers
safeguards.
When constitutional principles are involved-principles that su-
persede mere majority concerns-the court performs its truly important
function. By relating those principles to the facts of particular cases, the
judiciary advises us of the meaning of our fundamental values at partic-
ular points in our social evolution. Because the pressure of immediate
concerns can make it easy to lose sight of our values and to resist the
recognition that those values compel actions that may at times be dis-
tasteful, effective exposition can be quite difficult. When done properly,
however, judicial exposition produces attitude change and facilitates so-
cial progress. Under the expository model, when a court dispenses jus-
tice it does far more than prescribe outcomes in litigated cases. It
dispenses understanding of the terms of our social con-
tract-understanding that permits an appreciation of why those out-
comes are just.
Because disputes can be resolved adequately by article I tribunals,
the special characteristics of article III courts are best understood as
safeguards for effective exposition. Among those safeguards are the doc-
trines that comprise the law of justiciability, and an expository model of
adjudication has serious implications for those doctrines. Because we
use justiciability doctrines to confine the judiciary to appropriate judi-
cial conduct, "proper" development of the law of justiciability necessa-
rily depends upon one's view of the "proper" judicial function. Present
justiciability doctrines reflect the traditional, dispute-resolution model
of adjudication and are intended to limit the judiciary to those activities
necessary to redress an injury suffered by one of the disputants. If,
however, exposition is viewed as the essence of the judicial function,
certain changes in the law of justiciability become desirable.
The injury-orientation that characterizes the present formulation
of justiciability doctrines has generated serious confusion due to the lack
of any coherent concept of injury. Injury-orientation should be replaced
by a set of concerns more closely related to the objectives of an exposi-
tory judiciary. Because exposition poses some risk of encroachment
upon legislative authority, justiciability rules should be used to advance
separation-of-powers concerns that have been built into our constitu-
tional form of government. In addition, justiciability doctrines should be
designed to maximize the likelihood that judicial exposition will be
carefully considered and will benefit society.
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This Article advocates a conceptual shift from the dispute-resolu-
tion to the expository model of adjudication for article III courts. Part
I describes the traditional, dispute-resolution model and discusses its
incorporation into American jurisprudence. Part II describes the ex-
pository model of adjudication, and explains why it more accurately
defines the proper role of the federal judiciary. Part III explores the
consequences that adopting the expository model of adjudication would
have on the law of justiciability.
Part III,A traces how current justiciability rules have emerged
from the traditional model with their heavy emphasis on the concept of
injury, and suggests that current dissatisfaction with the law of jus-
ticiability stems from the absence of any intelligible concept of injury.
Part III,B considers how the law of justiciability should be reformu-
lated in order to correspond to the expository function of courts.
Part III,B,1 emphasizes that reformulated justiciability doctrines
should reflect our concern with proper maintenance of the constitu-
tional separation of powers. In many respects, our present, injury-ori-
ented, justiciability rules have developed in a perverse manner that may
actually encourage courts to exercise legislative policymaking functions
while deterring Congress from exercising those functions. Reformu-
lated doctrines, therefore, should induce courts to avoid usurpation of
legislative functions, whether that usurpation is manifest in undue judi-
cial activism or, as may frequently be the case, in undue judicial
abstention.
Part III,B,2 suggests that reformulated doctrines should focus both
on the context in which cases arise and on the likelihood that parties
will adequately present the issues in an adversary manner, in order to
reduce the likelihood of "erroneous" exposition. In addition, reformu-
lated doctrines should recognize that, in some circumstances, the need
for judicial exposition might not be sufficiently high to outweigh the
dangers attendant to exposition, and should permit courts honestly to
withhold the exercise of jurisdiction for that reason.
Because the dispute-resolution model of adjudication does not ac-
cord with current demands placed upon the judiciary, the present law
of justiciability is in serious disarray. Irreconcilable Supreme Court
precedents confuse litigants and promote ill-considered lower court de-
cisions. Proper appreciation of the expository function of courts permits
an intelligible reformulation of justiciability doctrines and, therefore,
will facilitate a consistent, principled approach to justiciability within
the federal judiciary.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF ADJUDICATION
A. Dispute Resolution and Principled Decisionmaking
The American legal system is premised largely on the theory that
the proper function of federal courts is to resolve disputes between liti-
gants who are unable or disinclined to resolve their differences them-
selves.' Under this theory, the traditional model of adjudication por-
trays the court as an attentive, unbiased apparatus for the production of
just results which the litigants will perceive as legitimate and authorita-
tive.' Adjudication satisfactory to the litigants, in turn, promotes social
order and harmony by precluding the need for recourse to other, so-
cially undesirable methods of conflict resolution.8
The legitimating aspect of the traditional model of adjudication is
the process of principled decisionmaking. The court ascertains the facts
giving rise to a dispute, 4 and then explains how generally accepted
I See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 366-68 (tentative ed. 1958); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976); Diver, The Judge as Political Pawnbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (1979); Fiss,
The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17
(1979); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357 (1978); Wel-
lington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 235
(1973).
For general discussions of a dispute-resolution model of the adjudicatory process, see H.
HART & A. SACKS, supra; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIL PROCEDURE, 4-8 (2d ed. 1977); Aldis-
err, The Nature of the Judicial Process: Revisited, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1980) (citing B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922)); Fuller, supra.
2 Recognition of the importance of perceived legitimacy appears to underlie commentary on
desirable features of the adjudicatory process. For example, Professor Fuller has suggested that
essential elements of that process include party participation and adherence to a principled mode
of decisionmaking. Fuller, supra note 1, at 369. Presumably, these features are deemed essential
precisely because they increase perceived legitimacy, thereby increasing the likelihood that parties
will acquiesce in judicial determinations. See infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
3 See Fuller, supra note 1, at 372; cf. Fiss, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that the "ultimate...
focus of the judicial inquiry is ... a social condition that threatens important constitutional values
and the organizational dynamic that creates and perpetuates that condition").
' The factfinding process is permeated with procedural safeguards designed to maximize its
reliability. Factfinders are chosen, in part, on the basis of their capacity for impartiality. They are
instructed to ignore their own biases. They are carefully insulated-often isolated-from uncon-
trolled communications concerning the dispute, and they are authorized to consider only evidence
that survives filtration through an elaborate screen of evidentiary rules. These procedural safe-
guards probably increase the reliability of the factfinding process. See generally Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (noting that features of the judicial process such as its adversary
nature, the screening of jurors to remove those who may be biased, and the cross-examination of
witnesses enhance reliability of information gathering at trial). Even if these safeguards do not
actually increase the reliability of factfinding, they do serve to increase the perceived legitimacy of
the process. The active role that the parties play in proceedings further enhances legitimacy. See
generally Fuller, supra note 1, at 369 (discussing the parties' participation in adjudication).
Moreover, the degree of procedural formality accorded litigants is arguably set at precisely that
level which optimizes, within the bounds of efficiency, social concerns with perceived legitimacy.
Cf Chayes, supra note 1, at 1287 (accuracy of factfinding limited by the requirement that all facts
be stated in the pleadings).
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principles of law, as applied to those facts, dictate the proper result.5
The principles help to insulate any given dispute from both the
prejudices of the decisionmaker and from salient aspects of the dispute
itself that might attract undue attention. Moreover, a properly applied
legal principle logically correlates the result in a particular dispute to
the accepted social order, which preexists the dispute. By making a re-
sult more than the product of one individual decisionmaker operating at
one particular time, principled decisionmaking enhances legitimacy by
vesting the result with the authority of a system that has, over time,
confronted many similar disputes and evolved the proper institutional
response.
B. Marbury: A Questionable Foundation
for the Traditional Model
The Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison,' exempli-
fies the traditional model's emphasis on dispute resolution. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall declared that the function of the judiciary was to remedy
the unauthorized invasion of legal rights.7 The invasion of a right im-
' The literature relating to the character and proper application of "legal principles" is a
vast one, much of which raises fundamental questions of legal philosophy. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 22-45 (1977); Wellington, supra note 1. Consideration of those fun-
damental questions is beyond the scope of the present discussion. For present purposes, it is suffi-
cient to emphasize that the principles applied to the facts must be accepted by the parties as valid
if they are to enhance deference to the adjudicatory tribunal.
For a sophisticated discussion of the interplay between factfinding and application of legal
principles-appreciation of which is likely to affect one's perception of the legitimacy of the judi-
cial process-see H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 1, at 373-85.
When discussing the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking, a colleague of mine is fond of
saying, "Don't forget about the robes," thereby suggesting that ritual is likely to be as potent a
factor in affecting the public perception of legitimacy as is the actual effectiveness of the princi-
pled-decisionmaking process.
£ 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
For general discussions of the historical and political contexts out of which the Marbury case
arose, see P. ACHESON, THE SUPREME COURT 40-56 (1961); L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL-A
LIFE IN LAW 394-417 (1974); 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 101-56 (1919); P.
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, CASES AND MATERIALS 49-50 (1975);
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 12-15 (10th ed. 1980); J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
J. NOWAK]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW § 3-2, at 22-23 (1978); 1 C. WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 169-268 (1922); Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-6.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163, 166. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison
stated that Marbury had a vested legal right to delivery of his commission as justice of the peace
for the District of Columbia, id. at 162, that the laws of the United States accorded Marbury a
remedy for the violation of that right, id. at 163, and that mandamus was an appropriate writ for
securing that remedy, id. at 173. Marbury was ultimately denied relief, however, because the
Court held that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction under article III of the Constitution
to issue the writ. Id. at 175-80. Although § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81, was
construed as congressional authorization for issuance of the writ by the Supreme Court, the Court
declared that statutory provision to be unconstitutional, see Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176-
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plies the existence of a dispute, and Marbury established that judicial
resolution of such disputes was proper.' Further, the opinion expressly
excluded conflicts not involving the abrogation of legal rights from the
category of matters appropriate for judicial action.' Marbury, thus,
has come to stand for the proposition that dispute resolution, and the
necessary incidents thereto, constitute inherent limitations on the scope
of the judicial function. 10 A federal court, therefore, is precluded from
elaborating upon the meaning of legal principles, except to the extent
that such elaboration is necessary for proper resolution of a dispute
before the court." Nonessential elaboration constitutes the issuance of
prohibited advisory opinions.'
2
80, thereby establishing the propriety of judicial review of the acts of coordinate branches of gov-
ernment-the proposition for which Marbury is often cited. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 6,
at 15-25; J. NOWAK, supra note 6, at 2-7.
' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167.
9 Id. at 170-71.
20 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-23 (1974);
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923). See generally United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 188-93 (1974); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 81 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as HART & WECHSLER (references to the 1981 supplement are preceded by "Supp.")]; Aldis-
ert, supra note 1, at 13; L. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300 (1979); R. Brilmayer, Judicial Re-
view, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method, 57 B.U.L. REV. 807 (1977);
Chayes, supra note 1, at 1285; Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82
YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-68, 1371 n.51 (1973); Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin
and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 91 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1378-79 (1978).
" The view that judicial activity that would be impermissible in isolation is, nevertheless,
permissible in the proper context, constitutes a rudimentary concept of federal justiciability. See
infra text accompanying notes 130-203.
" When, in 1793, the justices of the Supreme Court were asked to supply President Wash-
ington with answers to a series of abstract international law questions relating to the proper role
for the United States as a neutral country in the pending war between France and England, the
justices declined to comply with the President's request, finding the desired advisory opinions to
have been "expressly" and "purposely" precluded by the framers. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 10, at 64-66. The Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed the absence of federal court
jurisdiction to render advisory opinions, deeming this prohibition to be inherent in the "case" or
"controversy" language of article III, § 2 of the Constitution. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1968).
The rationale behind the prohibition on advisory opinions has been traced to concerns about
the proper separation of powers, L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 3-10, at 57; infringement on the
Court's judicial review function, HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 7-8; and creation of an
adequate context in which the judiciary performs its adjudicatory function, United States v.
Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); see also L. TRIBE, supra, § 3-10, at 57.
There are suggestions that the prohibition is not absolute. For example, the English courts,
from which the federal judiciary emerged, routinely issued advisory opinions. See Berger, Standing
to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Note,
The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary, 50 GEO. L.J. 785, 786-87 (1962).
Many state courts, which like federal courts emerged from the English tradition, are authorized to
issue advisory opinions. HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 69-70.
Even Supreme Court justices have taken actions that fairly can be categorized as the issuance
of advisory opinions. See id. at 68-69 (1790 letter from Chief justice Jay to President Washington
asserting unconstitutionality of having Supreme Court justices "ride circuit"; 1862 letter from
Chief justice Taney to the Secretary of Treasury asserting unconstitutionality of a tax on salaries
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Although Marbury is the case traditionally offered as the progeni-
tor of the dispute-resolution model," what that case says is quite differ-
ent from what it does. At issue in Marbury was the right of an ap-
pointed justice of the peace to delivery of his commission. Although the
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to order delivery of the commis-
sion," the Marbury opinion is replete with discussions concerning the
validity of the petitioner's appointment,' 5 his right to delivery of his
commission,'" the inconsequential nature of the fact that his commis-
sion had been withheld,' 7 and the fact that mandamus was an appro-
priate writ for a court with jurisdiction to use in requiring delivery.'8
The Marbury-based dispute-resolution model appears to compel the
conclusion that the Marbury Court's own pronouncements were im-
proper. Lacking constitutional jurisdiction to provide Marbury with
any relief, the Court also lacked jurisdiction to opine as to otherwise
pertinent principles of law.'
The political context out of which the Marbury decision arose
20
renders it even more inconsistent with the traditional model. Much of
the discussion in the case seems to have been intended to accomplish
partisan, political objectives-arguably ones that offend the principle of
of federal judges). In fact, the well-established practices of issuing not only separate opinions but
also dicta in majority opinions can be characterized as the issuance of advisory opinions. See Note,
supra, at 795-802. The relationship between the advisory opinion prohibition and justiciability
doctrine is discussed infra notes 206-22 and accompanying text.
'3 Responsibility for perpetuating the dispute-resolution model of adjudication cannot be at-
tributed entirely to Marbury. Although the language of the opinion supports a dispute-resolution
restriction on judicial actions, it is the use that subsequent courts and commentators have made of
the landmark decision that has crystalized the restriction. See authorities cited supra note 10.
" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175-76.
15 Id. at 154-61.
IS Id. at 161-66.
17 Id.
1 Id. at 168-73.
: See P. BREST, supra note 6, at 49 (noting Republican criticism of the Court for examining
the merits when it conceded that it lacked jurisdiction); c. Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 6-8
(criticizing Marshall for addressing the merits before jurisdiction but suggesting the justification
that Marshall was demonstrating the need to reach the constitutional question and to overturn an
act of Congress). A possible justification for the Court's actions within the confines of the dispute-
resolution model is that courts properly can expound legal principles pertinent to any legal right
that is asserted, whether the asserted right is ultimately upheld or not. The Court's actions in
Marbury might alternatively be justified under the now-prevalent doctrine that courts should
avoid the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)-a doctrine that had not yet developed when Marbury
was decided. Under this view, the Court's dicta was necessary to ensure that adjudication of the
constitutionIity of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81, could'not be avoided. See
Van Alstyne, supra at 7-8. The dicta in Marbury arguably increases comprehension of the major
proposition of the case: that courts possess the power to undertake judicial review. Perhaps the
Court was trying to illustrate the potency of its holding by emphasizing that even though Marbury
possessed all of the dictum-based rights discussed in the opinion, the Court was still powerless to
provide any relief under an unconstitutional grant of jurisdiction.
20 See authorities cited supra note 6.
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separation of powers." Moreover, the Court apparently lacked any
serious concern with the rights of the parties before it. The Court may
well have sacrificed Marbury's right to his commission precisely be-
cause it wished to establish a principle of judicial independence, which
was of immediate political concern to the Federalists.2
A realistic explanation of the Marbury Court's conduct is that the
Court's primary objective was to make statements about the legal issues
that it addressed-to expound on principles of law including the nature
of judicial review. 8 In so doing, the Court defined the role of the article
III judiciary in the American system of government more concretely
than the text of the Constitution had. The Court gave explicit meaning
to the general terms and structure of the Constitution. Ironically, Mar-
bury itself suggests that exposition may be a more significant aspect of
the judicial function, both in terms of motive and effect, than the mere
resolution of disputes between individuals.
II. THE EXPOSITORY MODEL OF ADJUDICATION
The exposition of law that occurs during the process of adjudica-
tion serves an important *governmental function, which should be
viewed as the primary function of courts rather than as a mere incident
to the resolution of disputes. By explaining how legal principles pro-
duce particular results in particular factual contexts, courts give opera-
tional meaning to principles that would otherwise remain abstract, rhe-
torical and elusive.24
Legal principles can emanate from statutes or constitutional provi-
sions,25 and their origin affects the function served by exposition.
Where statutes are involved, exposition provides useful information to
the executive and feedback to legislative policymakers, thereby permit-
" To the extent that courts engage in "improper" exposition of the law, they may, in effect,
be "legislating" in a manner that offends the principle of separation of powers. See infra notes
205-57 and accompanying text.
2' See M. SHAPIRO, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30 (5th ed. 1979); see also M. CO-
HEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 178-80 (1946).
23 C Monaghan, supra note 10, at 1370-71.
'" See infra note 37. By explaining how legal principles produce particular results, courts
generate a body of precedent that illuminates the meaning of each principle through reference to
particular factual contexts. The successive refinement that characterizes adjudication can establish,
for example, that the general principle that the taking of a human life is unlawful isgot offended
in cases of self defense, unless there was use of excessive force, unless the use of excessive force
was unintentional, unless, although unintentional, the use of such force was negligent, and so on.
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 19 at 108-12 (4th ed. 1971). As
more and more cases are decided, the meaning of the principles being expounded becomes clearer.
2" See infra text accompanying notes 27-66. Legal principles can also be articulated in trea-
ties, administrative regulations or rulings, and in common law decisions. To the extent that such
principles are subject to legislative modification, they can be viewed as statutory principles.
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ting the legislative process to operate at the level of generality called for
by separation-of-powers principles. Where constitutional provisions are
involved, exposition serves an even more important function. Constitu-
tional exposition gives meaning to those principles we view as so funda-
mental that they should be placed beyond the reach of direct majority
control.2" For a variety of institutional reasons, we place them in the
custody of article III courts, which are particularly well-qualified to
oversee their development.
Given the importance of the courts' expository role in the federal
legislative process and of their role as the guardians and interpreters of
fundamental rights, exposition rather than dispute resolution should be
viewed as the primary function of the courts. Unlike dispute resolution,
which could be performed adequately by purely private parties through
arbitration, exposition is central to the process by which society pro-
vides for its long term growth. The dispute-resolution model of adjudi-
cation views exposition as a mere incident to dispute resolution, failing
to recognize the importance of a court's expository role within the fed-
eral government. It should, therefore, be replaced by a model that bet-
ter recognizes the benefits and dangers of exposition.
After developing such a model through the exploration of both the
nature of statutory and constitutional exposition and the competence of
the judiciary to expound, this Article describes in part III how adher-
ence to an expository model of adjudication can result in justiciability
doctrines that are more coherent than the confused doctrines now ex-
isting under the traditional, dispute-resolution model.
A. Statutory Exposition
Judicial exposition of statutes is essential to proper operation of
the legislative process. Consistent with separation-of-powers principles,
the body that makes law should not be the body that applies it. By
separating the policymaking functions of government from the imple-
menting functions, the likelihood of abuse of power is reduced. Because
no single branch of government possesses all of the authority needed to
govern, dangerous concentrations of power are avoided that otherwise
would permit the government to exploit underrepresented, minority in-
2' The distinction between legal principles-such as those embodied in statutes-that are
established and controlled by the majority, and legal principles-such as those embodied in consti-
tutional provisions-that are placed beyond the reach of direct majority control reflects a basic
dichotomy of legal philosophy that has been discussed by a variety of commentators. See, e.g., R.
DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 81-130; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-88 (1961); H.
HART & A. SACKS, supra note 1, at 155-60; Wellington, supra note 1, at 222-29.
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terests for the benefit of better represented majorities.27
In order for separation of powers to be an effective check on abuse
of power, the legislature, which makes governmental policy, must oper-
ate at the proper level of generality. If legislative enactments are too
specific, the legislature effectively exercises governmental power alone,
because executive implementation becomes merely ministerial and can-
not serve as a check on legislative abuses. Accordingly, statutes should
be directed at categories of conduct rather than individuals. If legisla-
tive enactments are too general, however, the executive is granted such
broad discretion that it can effectively exercise all governmental power
at the implementation stage without any legislative check on its exercise
of power.28
Separation of powers is not the only way a degree of legislative
generality reduces governmental abuses. When legislatures formulate
general policies, rather than act in an ad hoc way on isolated matters,
the quality of their enactments is likely to be improved. Their actions
are less likely to be arbitrary, and more likely to be carefully consid-
ered, simply because more is at stake. 29 Generality also reduces the po-
tential for legislative disregard of the interests of underrepresented mi-
norities. The procedures and procedural safeguards of the legislative
process do not lend themselves to meaningful participation by individu-
als or politically powerless groups. Legislating with respect to catego-
ries of conduct that are likely to affect a broader range of interests than
enactments directed at specific individuals or groups, subjects legislative
7 The doctrine of separation of powers is intended generally to advance the objectives of
impartiality, uniformity and predictability in the enactment and application of law. For a concise
introduction to the principles of separation of powers, see S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 37-39 (1979). Professor Ely has constructed an entire
theory of constitutional law around the problems that can result from the underrepresentation of
certain groups in the legislature. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); see also L.
TRIBE, supra note 6, § 10-1, at 474-77; Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and
the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 787-89 (1971); Note, The Bounds of Legislative
Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962).
" See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 27, at 37-39. Because it is quite difficult to
specify with any degree of precision what level of generality best promotes separation-of-powers
objectives, the generality requirement cannot, as a practical matter, be judicially enforceable except
in extreme cases. The goal of legislating at the proper level of generality, however, remains a
worthwhile aspirational objective for legislative policymakers.
" Most legislation results from the balancing of competing interests. For example, endan-
gered-species legislation, such as that discussed infra, text accompanying notes 38-43, might well
result from balancing the costs of protecting certain species of life against the environmental, aes-
thetic or scientific benefits such protection might produce. Presumably, many of the potential fu-
ture benefits cannot be known at the time that the legislation is enacted. Accordingly, the proper
cost-benefit balance requires some legislative sensitivity to unspecified, potential future gains. Such
sensitivity is likely to be reduced where the unknown potential benefits of a particular species are
balanced against the known costs of a particular project. If Congress fails to act on a level of
generality permitting meaningful weight to be given to the possibility of potential future benefits,
the primary purposes of endangered-species legislation could well be lost.
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policies to a more rigorous test of popular support."0 Avoidance of the
abuses that can result from overly specific legislation lies at the core of
the bill-of-attainder prohibition in the Constitution 1 and is also re-
flected in the prohibition on enactment of ex post facto laws, 2 the
nondelegation doctrine, 3 and our preference for rulemaking rather
than adjudication for certain types of administrative agency actions.3
Judicial exposition of statutes facilitates operation of the legislative
process in two ways. First, exposition can "save" a statute that would
otherwise be too general to serve as a check on executive power by
"explaining" the limitations on implementation that the legislature nec-
essarily intended, even though they might not appear in any salient
way on the face of the statute. 5 In so doing, the court gives to a statute
meaning that it would not otherwise have, but such exposition is not
necessarily objectionable, as long as the court does not usurp poli-
cymaking functions from the legislature. 6 In this regard, exposition
aids the executive in proper implementation of legislative enactments.
Second, exposition also provides the legislature with important in-
formation about the meaning of its enactments. Because legislative
policymakers, operating at the proper level of generality, do not partici-
pate in the implementation of their policies, they do not know what the
precise consequences of their enactments will be. They cannot antici-
pate every situation to which their generic statutes will apply; nor,
under separation-of-powers theory, should they try to.37 Rather, it is
the function of the judiciary to give meaning to the general, often ab-
stract, policies adopted by the legislature, through reference to specific
factual contexts. The legislature is then free to use the feedback ob-
tained through judicial exposition of statutes to modify or repeal them
if their judicially acquired meaning does not accord with the legisla-
ture's policy preferences. Consistent with separation-of-powers princi-
ples, however, legislative modifications, like initial enactments, should
be made at the proper level of generality.
An example of the manner in which statutory exposition plays a
30 See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 1, at 708-13; L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 10-5, at
491-99.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 3. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 10-5, at 491-99; Note, supra
note 27.
n U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 10-5, at 499.
33 See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 5-17, at 284-91.
u' See SEC v. Chenery (I), 318 U.S. 80, 90-93 (1943). But see SEC v. Chenery (II), 332
U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947).
35 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
642-46 (1980); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 747-59 (D.D.C. 1971)
(three-judge court).
36 See infra text accompanying note 223.
37 See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 27, at 37-39.
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role in the legislative process is provided by the snail darter case, Ten-
nessee Valley Authority v. Hill." There, the Supreme Court held that
the Endangered Species Act3 9 required abandonment of a government
sponsored construction project in order to protect the snail darter from
threatened extinction. As construed by the Court, the Endangered Spe-
cies Act reflected such a strong societal policy favoring protection of
endangered species that construction of a $100 million hydroelectric
plant had to be halted in order to protect a three-inch aquatic animal
that serves no discernible social purpose.40 Although one might ques-
tion whether Congress intended that result in enacting the statute, such
a policy is certainly rational. Whether one believes that the termination
of any life form is inherently immoral or suspects that snail darter eggs
may someday prove to be the cure for cancer, a legislature could justifi-
ably choose to adopt a policy favoring the snail darter over the dam. In
reality, it is unlikely that Congress ever contemplated the precise ques-
tion posed by the snail darter case when it considered the legislation.
Legislative intent is largely a fiction, and it is quite likely that different
legislators had very different concerns in mind when they voted for the
Act. The "true" meaning of the statute was the meaning the Court
gave it through statutory exposition.
Congress is, of course, free to modify its legislation if it disap-
proves of the meaning given a statute by the judiciary, and Congress
did precisely that with respect to the Endangered Species Act. Congress
first amended the Act to provide procedures for determining whether
ongoing projects should be subject to strict compliance with the require-
ments of the statute-a modification arguably made at the proper level
of legislative generality.41 When, however, those new procedures failed
to permit completion of the dam, Congress simply exempted it from the
Act in an amendment to an appropriations bi1 42-an action almost cer-
tainly taken at an improper level of generality. Regardless of one's
views about the propriety of congressional conduct in amending the En-
dangered Species Act,43 the amendments do illustrate the manner in
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
40 See 437 U.S. at 156-73.
41 Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, sec. 3, 92 Stat. 3571, 3572-60 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III 1979)). See 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9453, 9460-66, 9492-
93. 9 4 Act of Sept. 25, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-69, tit. IV, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50. See 35 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 223-29 (1979).
40 The suggestion that legislatures should adjust their statutes as courts provide them with
more data concerning how the statutes operate does not mean that legislatures should simply over-
rule specific judicial decisions as Congress did with respect to Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill. In
responding to judicial decisions, Congress should not abandon the goal of legislating with the
degree of generality necessary to preserve separation-of-powers safeguards. If Congress disap-
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which judicial exposition affects the legislative process.
Statutory exposition, therefore, is more than a mere step in the
dispute-resolution process. It is part of the process of governing. The
meaning that the courts give to legislative statements of general policy
both permits the executive to implement legislative policies and the leg-
islature to modify its statutes in ways that are consistent with separa-
tion-of-powers principles.
B. Constitutional Exposition
Unlike statutes, constitutional provisions reflect more than mere
majoritarian policies subject to modification by the legislature."" The
principles embodied in the Constitution are generally thought to reflect
our fundamental values.45 Although not immutable, constitutional prin-
ciples are insulated from direct majority control.46 As a result, when
courts expound on constitutional rather than statutory provisions, the
judicial function takes on added significance.
Like statutes, constitutional provisions tend to be general and as-
pirational in nature, 7 taking their operative meaning from the factual
contexts to which they are applied. For example, the first amendment
provides that free speech should not be abridged,' 8 but its language
proved of the result in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, it properly should have refined the catego-
ries of competing interests that were balanced during enactment of the Endangered Species Act, or
provided for neutral procedures to temper the consequences of the Supreme Court's decisions. By
singling out the Tellico Dam Project, the project at issue in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, as the
sole object of remedial legislation, Congress violated separation-of-powers principles. See generally
H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 1, at 800-08 (discussing legislative options for responding to
judicial decisions).
" A constitutional provision cannot be modified by a majority of Congress. Rather, two-
thirds of each House of Congress or of the state legislatures are required to propose amendments
to the Constitution, and those proposals become effective only after ratification by the legislatures
or conventions of three-fourths of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V.
4, As used in the present context, fundamental values are values that supersede mere
majoritarian desires. The Constitution, of course, is not the only repository of our fundamental
values. Other social institutions, such as churches, schools, television networks and the like, also
develop and transmit fundamental values.
4, It is important to emphasize that constitutional provisions can be changed if the populace
desires the change enough to endure the arduous amendment process and to amass the required
supermajorities. As such, constitutional principles are not, strictly speaking, "fundamental"; they
are, rather, supermajoritarian. It is unlikely, however, that a viable society could ever develop
principles that were absolutely "fundamental." The terms "fundamental" and
"supermajoritarian" are here treated as synonymous.
47 Some constitutional provisions are, of course, more specific in nature, such as the provision
requiring ratification of proposed constitutional amendments by three-fourths of the states. U.S.
CONST. art. V. Even the more specific provisions present unanswered questions, however, such as
whether a state can revoke its ratification of a proposed amendment-the question presented to the
Supreme Court in Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981), cert. granted sub nom.
NOW v. Idaho, 102 S Ct. 1273 (1982). Such issues properly are resolved through recourse to the
aspirational objectives of the provision in question.
" The Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
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alone does not determine whether a particularly salacious book can be
banned without violating the principle of free speech.4" Likewise, the
fifth and fourteenth amendments' commandment that equal protection
of the laws should not be denied5" does not alone determine whether
the principle is violated by subjecting men but not women to a military
draft.5" Moreover, changing social circumstances can render proper ap-
plication of a constitutional principle uncertain. The principle of free
speech, which may initially have contemplated politicians making
speeches and distributing leaflets to small crowds, can be quite difficult
to apply in the context of a commercial television advertisement
designed by psychologists to have subconscious effects upon millions of
viewers. Society has assigned to the judiciary the task of determining
how constitutional provisions apply in particular circumstances.
52
When courts expound constitutional provisions, they restate soci-
ety's fundamental values in concrete, understandable terms, enabling
individuals and institutions to incorporate those values into their con-
duct.5" For example, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion" reduced the aspirational equal protection principle to an opera-
tional level in the context of public education by instructing us that, as
a society espousing the value of equality, we could no longer maintain
racially segregated school systems. 5
of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49 The degree of first amendment protection properly accorded forms of expression viewed by
many as offensive raises questions that have continually plagued the Supreme Court. See generally
L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-16, at 656-70.
" The Constitution provides that "no state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the fourteenth
amendment, by its terms, applies only to the states, the Supreme Court has asserted that equal
protection principles should also be read into the due process clause of the fifth amendment, mak-
ing equal protection constraints applicable to the federal government as well. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). For a critical analysis of the legitimacy of this assertion, see Hutchin-
son, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO.
L.J. 1, 44-50 (1979).
*" This question was presented to, and resolved in the negative by, the Supreme Court in
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
' See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
For general discussions of the judicial process as something that relates more to the imple-
mentation of social values than to the process of traditional dispute resolution, see G. GUNTHER,
supra note 6, at 1605-06; J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY. THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW
(1978); Chayes, supra note 1; Fiss, supra note 1; Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions:
The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Monaghan, supra
note 10.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The Court's decision rejected the then-prevailing view, exemplified by its earlier decision
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that the Constitution tolerated state maintenance of
separate-but-equal facilities. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95. Under a narrow reading, Brown
stands for the proposition that state-sanctioned racial segregation in public education is unconstitu-
tional. Under a broader reading, Brown stands for the proposition that any legislative classification
based upon race that fails to meet exacting standards is unconstitutional. This broader reading
seems to have served as the basis for the Court's later decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
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When Brown was decided, the nation's majority may well have
favored maintenance of racially segregated schools." In such situations,
where judicial interpretations of our fundamental values are not in har-
mony with the majority view, the risk of popular rejection makes con-
stitutional exposition a particularly difficult judicial function. The art
of constitutional exposition involves determining when a particular
meaning should be ascribed to a constitutional value. It would be naive
to believe that constitutional provisions mean the same thing-compel
the same conduct-at all points in time.57 Societies evolve, and funda-
mental-value changes accompany social evolution. Although the Brown
decision would have been unthinkable 100 years earlier, by the time
Brown was decided, society arguably was ready to accept the meaning
the Court then ascribed to the equal protection principle of the Consti-
tution.58 Part of the judicial function, then, is to monitor the evolution
of social attitudes and to translate the language of the Constitution into
(1967), in which a Virginia statute prohibiting racial intermarriages involving white persons was
held unconstitutional. Id. at 11-12.
"Cf£ S. WASBY, A. D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEX-
ANDER 95-96 (1977) (discussing public opposition to Brown). Public hostility to Brown was, of
course, especially strong in the South, where by 1960 only six percent of all black pupils were
attending integrated schools. M. KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 130-31 (1961).
" The organic nature of constitutional provisions is illustrated by the developments in equal
protection law between the Plessy and Brown decisions. See supra note 41. The issue is presented
in a particularly tantalizing form by the question of whether Supreme Court constitutional deci-
sions should be given only prospective effect, or should be given some degree of retroactive effect as
well. As Professor Mishkin points out, Supreme Court articulation of a prospective-only rule
bears more resemblence to legislation than it does to the process of adjudication under the tradi-
tional, dispute-resolution model. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term: Foreward: The High
Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); see
also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679-81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). As a result,
Professor Mishkin disagreed with the Supreme Court's recognition of a power to issue prospec-
tive-only decisions, upheld in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), precisely because such
recognition would eliminate an important constraint limiting the judiciary to "proper" judicial
activity. Mishkin, supra, at 62-72. Although Professor Mishkin offered an alternative justification
for the Linkletter decision, grounded in the nature and function of the writ of habeas corpus, id. at
79-92, the commonly perceived need to facilitate Supreme Court development of constitutional law
in a way that will have primarily prospective impact supports the propriety of an expository
model of adjudication. See infra text accompanying note 81-120. Consistent with this view, some
commentators have criticized recognition of an emerging good-faith exception to the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule precisely because such an exception would reduce judicial development of
fourth amendment law, thereby providing less prospective guidance to law enforcement officials.
See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating
the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. LJ. 365, 401-06, 431-33 (1981).
" This characterization of the degree of social acceptability of the Brown decision may be too
optimistic. Opposition to mandatory desegregation persists today, nearly 30 years later, even on
the part of minorities who arguably were the intended beneficiaries of Brown. See D. BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 424-31 (2d ed. 1980).
Most contemporary opposition, however, is directed not at the issue of school desegregation
itself but at the use of busing to achieve desegregation. This is evidenced by the large number of
antibusing bills introduced in the 97th Congress. See Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term:
Foreward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 18 n.3 (1981).
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prescriptions for behavior that stimulate, or at least keep pace with,
social evolution.59
The effectiveness of constitutional exposition will turn not only
upon the accuracy of the court's assessment of prevailing social atti-
tudes, but upon the persuasiveness of the court's opinions as well. For
example, the more effectively a court can link the conduct at issue to
other conduct that society has already accepted by relating both forms
of conduct to the same constitutional principle, the more likely the
court's decision will be to secure popular acceptance. Similarly, the
ability of the court to articulate a relationship between the popular
meaning of constitutional language and the language's application in a
given case will increase an opinion's persuasiveness."0 If an opinion,
however, is not based persuasively on precedent, constitutional lan-
guage or the apparent intent of the framers, popular acceptance is less
likely. The exposition behind a court's judgment, therefore, may be
more important than the judgment itself.
The judgment disposes of the case before the court by resolving the
dispute between the parties, but it is the exposition of the opinion that
increases society's understanding of the principles involved. As people
better understand principles, they incorporate them more readily into
their conduct. On one level, this assimilation occurs because legal en-
forcement usually accompanies judicial recognition that a principle
compels particular conduct. For example, it is now generally recognized
that because burning people at the stake is inconsistent with the princi-
ple proscribing cruel and unusual punishment, 1 it is likely to result in
the imposition of legal sanctions. There is, however, another more du-
rable level on which constitutional principles can be incorporated into
conduct. Because fundamental principles represent, by hypothesis, ba-
sic, socially accepted values, application of a principle to conduct should
be self-executing to some extent as the principle becomes better under-
stood. The relative rarity of barbaric forms of punishment in our cul-
59 Under a particularly activist view, the judiciary spearheads social development by perceiv-
ing the need for social change well before that need is recognized by most members of society and
by subjecting the masses to norms espoused by advanced social thinkers at the earliest moment that
popular acceptance becomes possible. Under a less activist view, the judiciary is more of a follower
than a leader, functioning to ensure that recalcitrant elements in society keep pace with social
developments that have already been guided down the path of majority acceptance by other social
institutions. As is developed infra text accompanying notes 67-120, the unique attributes of a
properly selected judiciary, in terms of skill, institutional constraints, and accountability, render
thejudiciary a desirable leader in the process of evolving social norms. Cf Fiss, supra note 1, at 9-
17 (arguing judges are in a good position to give meaning to Constitutional values).
60 Nelson, Emulating the Marshall Court: The Applicability of the Rule of Law to Contem-
porary Constitutional Adjudication (Book Review), 131 U. PA. L. REV. 489 (1982).
"z The Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive ball shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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ture results less from the fear of legal sanctions than from internaliza-
tion of the belief that burning people at the stake is wrong- 2
The text of the Constitution provides the general framework under
which our society operates. The principles contained therein underlie
the rules of our society, but those rules change as social circumstances
change. Constitutional exposition by the federal judiciary permits the
change to be orderly as the court develops new constitutional norms.
Compliance with these developing norms, theoretically, is obtained
through the threat of legal sanctions. Realistically, however, if a judi-
cial order is sufficiently unpopular, legal enforcement will simply be
withheld by the executive,6" which, under the separation of powers, has
control of the enforcement mechanisms needed to compel compliance
with'rules enunciated by the courts. The only enforcement mechanism
at the disposal of the judiciary itself is the "resource of rhetoric." '64 But
" Other examples also exist. Before the Civil War, black slaves were not entitled to receive
an education at public expense, and frequently were even prohibited by law from learning to read
or write. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR-RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 198, 250, 258, 308 (1978). Even if Brown v. Board of
Educ has not achieved complete popular acceptance, see supra note 58, at the very least, society
has internalized the belief that blacks have a fundamental right to a publicly financed education.
Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) that cer-
tain criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel regardless of their
ability to pay has probably been accepted and internalized to such a degree that the threat of legal
sanctions is no longer a significant factor in government acquiescence in the requirement.
Social psychologists have propounded a theory of cognitive dissonance that helps to account
for the type of internalization described herein. See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1957); see also J. BREHM & A. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1962). According to this theory, individuals are able to tolerate only a small degree of dissonance
between their attitudes and their behavior. If behavior is controlled initially-for example, by
threatening imposition of legal sanctions for noncompliance-attitudes will change to parallel the
controlled behavior in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. See L. FESTINGER, supra; J. BREHM &
A. COHEN, supra. If such a theory properly can be extrapolated from individuals to societies, the
threat of legal enforcement would appear to become largely superfluous after an appropriate pe-
riod of time. Social attitude change-evolution of the pertinent social value-will be sufficient to
incorporate the new constitutional norm.
" The most glaring example of such a reaction arose during Supreme Court adjudication of
the various Cherokee Cases, when both the State of Georgia and President Jackson seemed deter-
mined to ignore any Supreme Court order that would have hindered Georgia from removing the
Cherokee from their tribal lands. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 506 (1969). In the end, a crisis was averted when the litigation
was dropped. Id. at 530. Nevertheless, these cases did give rise to Andrew Jackson's supposed
remark, "John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." See G. GUNTHER, supra
note 6, at 30.
Defiance of unpopular judicial decisions can also take more subtle forms. For example, the
controversy that continues to surround busing as a means of desegregating public schools, see
supra note 58, has done much to undermine the Supreme Court's command that schools be deseg-
regated "with all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
" The phrase "resource of rhetoric" has been used by Professor Bickel to suggest that, aside
from the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court possesses a very real power to affect politi-
cal actions merely by commenting upon them. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 188 (1962). Presumably, the Court's esteem gives
its comments some degree of coercive impact.
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because the federal judiciary possesses the authority to act as final ex-
positor of the Constitution, 5 its rhetorical power can be quite potent.
Controversial rulings by the judiciary place society on the horns of
a dilemma. Society must either accept the norms that the court
prescribes, or be guilty of violating its own fundamental values. There-
fore, by accurately monitoring the nature and intensity of social atti-
tudes and skillfully crafting its opinions, the court can expound in a
way that permits this dilemma consistently to be resolved in accordance
with the court's construction of the constitutional principle at issue. In
order to do this, however, the court must prescribe norms that are not
so distasteful that society as a whole would rather reject the fundamen-
tal value relied on by the court than conform to the prescribed norm. A
judiciary concerned with exposition, and possessing the skill and vision
necessary to mold societal attitudes, is able not only to maneuver ac-
ceptance of particular decisions, but in the long run to foster organic
growth of the Constitution and to facilitate social progress. 6
C. Judicial Competence to Expound
Statutory and constitutional exposition are important governmen-
tal functions, and, within the scheme of separated powers, the judiciary
is particularly well-qualified to perform those functions.67  The federal
judiciary is well-qualified because article III courts 8 operate within an
elaborate set of constraints that act as safeguards against imprudent
exposition and create the proper balance between independence and po-
litical accountability for an institution entrusted with the expository
function of government.
" See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[ilt follows that the interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the
land").
" Cf supra note 62 (discussing the theory of cognitive dissonance). "Social progress" is a
term which, of course, is not value-free. As used in the present context, the term means nothing
more than social change that, over the course of time, will generally be viewed as a step in the
right direction. With the benefit of hindsight, most would agree that the abolition of slavery
constituted "social progress," although such a characterization would have been hotly contested in
1865. Brown v. Board of Educ. probably also constituted "social progress," although some would
undoubtedly question that characterization even at the present time.
67 Cf R. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 86-88, 123-30 (past political decisions, political respon-
sibility, and personal morality underlie judicial decisionmaking); Monaghan, supra note 10, at
1368 ("[T]he Court rather than the political branches is uniquely suited for this task [of interpret-
ing the Constitution], [but] it is by no means evident that it should be a function of ordinary
litigation concerning private rights.").
" Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme Court and in the
inferior courts created by Congress pursuant to art. I, § 8, cl. 9 of the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1. Article III judges are accorded a degree of independence from other branches of
government. Id. In addition, article III-courts are subject to certain specified limitations on their
jurisdiction, most notably, the limitations embodied in the "case" and "controversy" provisions of
article III. Id. § 2; see infra text accompanying note 121.
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The most salient of the article III constraints stems from the gen-
eral proposition that courts exist merely to construe laws, not to make
them. 9 The federal judiciary does not have carte blanche to rewrite
statutes or construct constitutional principles out of thin air; its rulings
must have some independent external genesis, either explicit in the stat-
utory or constitutional text itself, or implicit in the provision under con-
sideration.7 0 Courts also customarily refrain from constitutional exposi-
tion if another basis for decision is available.7 1 This constraint not only
reduces the likelihood that judicial determinations will conflict with
popular desires but precludes unnecessary judicial exposition as well.
The doctrine of stare decisis also operates as a constraint.7 Courts
are required to. advance a principled explanation for their actions and
to remain relatively consistent in their application of principles. Since
today's pronouncements will constrain tomorrow's actions, the judiciary
has an incentive to consider carefully the wisdom of every proposed
disposition and to make each disposition as narrow as circumstances
permit. Other constraints imposed by the justiciability doctrines dis-
cussed in part III of this Article ensure that the context in which a
decision is made is adequately developed and that both sides of the issue
are adequately presented, enabling the court to reach a well-reasoned
decision. 3
Perhaps the most significant constraint operating upon the judici-
ary, however, arises from the need to retain institutional legitimacy.
Credibility is essential to successful performance of the judicial func-
tion. The loss of perceived legitimacy that results from repeated issu-
" The Supreme Court has emphasized that:
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To the legis-
lative department has been committed the duty of making laws; to the executive the
duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying
them in cases properly brought before the courts. The general rule is that neither
department may invade the province of the other and neither may control, direct or
restrain the action of the other.
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). C R. DWORIN, supra note 5, at 81-90.
70 There is spirited debate over what degree of adherence to the text of the document being
construed is necessary to ensure that the judiciary does not transcend the judicial function. See G.
GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 23-25. It is likely, however, that virtually everyone would agree that
some degree of adherence to the text, history, or structure of the document, or to the intent of the
drafters is desirable.
71 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919); see also Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); J. NOWAK, supra note 6,
at 83-85.
72 For general discussions of the tension between adhering to precedent and modifying legal
principles as necessary see H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 1, at 587-89; R. Brilmayer, supra
note 10, at 811-14; Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 330-31
(1940) (address to conference on status of the rule of judicial precedent).
73 See infra text accompanying notes 121-25.
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ance of unpersuasive opinions or excessively unpopular decisions could
seriously threaten the judiciary's role as final expositor of the Constitu-
tion. Without perceived institutional legitimacy the judiciary cannot
perform the subtle task of developing constitutional norms. Judicial ap-
preciation of the need to preserve public trust and confidence, therefore,
necessarily tempers judicial activism and limits the effective scope of
judicial discretion."'
' The judiciary has no coercive power of its own, and must rely on the power of the execu-
tive to enforce judicial orders. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (A. Hamilton). Executive enforce-
ment may be withheld in some circumstances, see supra note 63, thereby precipitating an inter-
branch conflict, which is unseemly at best, and at worst poses a threat to the continued structure of
government. If, for example, President Nixon had refused to give the "Watergate" tapes to the
Special Prosecutor after the Supreme Court ordered him to do so in United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974), a constitutional crisis could well have resulted.
If Congress or the President were to defy the Supreme Court by refusing to comply with or
to enforce the Court's mandate, the stakes of the ensuing conflict would be quite high. Aware of
the stakes involved, each branch of government is likely to take great care to avoid precipitation of
such a conflict. Neither Congress nor the President, in modern times, could be expected to defy
the Court in the absence of compelling political reasons. Moreover, if such political reasons were
to exist, the Court most likely would avoid issuing an order prompting defiance. Accordingly, the
judiciary can be termed a "political" branch of government to the extent that political considera-
tions inherent in the courts' desire for self preservation and preservation of our constitutional form
of government play a part in judicial decisionmaking.
There is evidence that Supreme Court recognition of the practical need to defer to potent
political pressures can cause the Court to forsake its fidelity to the process of principled decision-
making. In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), and 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per
curiam), the United States Supreme Court was asked to invalidate on constitutional grounds a
Virginia miscegenation statute that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had permitted to be
used to annul a marriage between a white woman and a Chinese man. The United States Su-
preme Court, vacated the Virginia court's decision and remanded for clarification of the record.
350 U.S. 891. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, merely reaffirmed its earlier
decision and refused to clarify the record. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956) (per
curiam). Nevertheless, when the petitioner moved the United States Supreme Court to recall or
amend the mandate, the Court denied the motion, finding that the constitutional question had not
been "properly presented." 350 U.S. at 985. The Virginia court's decision remained in effect. See
id.
The actions of the United States Supreme Court were unprincipled in two respects. First,
because Naim v. Naim came before the Court after its decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), see supra note 55, the Virginia miscegenation statute was almost certainly un-
constitutional, as it was so declared eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Failure to invalidate the statute in Naim v. Nalm without distinguishing Brown was a failure of
principled decisionmaking. Second, because Naim v. Naim came before the Supreme Court on
appeal from the highest court of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the Supreme Court did not have
discretion to decline to resolve the case on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1976); see also Hicks
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 334 (1975). The Court, therefore, ignored a congressional command
without offering any principled justification for doing so. The Supreme Court's practice of dis-
missing mandatory appeals for want of a "properly presented" federal question, however, has
become commonplace. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 656-62. In many respects, this
technique for avoiding the exercise of jurisdiction is similar to the justiciability devices discussed
infra text accompanying notes 121-310.
The Court surely anticipated that its conduct in Naim v. Naim would result in some loss of
esteem by those who understood what the Court had done. Cf Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 11-13 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1959) (dismissal of the miscegenation case was "wholly without basis in the law")
[hereinafter cited as Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles], reprinted in H. WECHSLER, PRINCI-
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Trust in the federal judiciary is enhanced by the common percep-
tion that the judiciary is a nonpolitical branch of government.75  This
perceived lack of political accountability, in turn, has generated the
equally common perception that the judiciary operates in a manner that
is countermajoritarian. Both perceptions, however, are flawed.
Although federal judges cannot be removed from office or have
their salaries reduced for political purposes," the judiciary is not en-
tirely nonpolitical. Its political accountability is simply less immediate
than that of the other branches of government. The political pressures
to which the judiciary is subject enable the majority to maintain a cer-
tain degree of leverage over judicial actions. For example, when a court
construes a statute, the court's determination can be nullified by a polit-
ically accountable legislature, which can repeal or amend the legislation
to achieve a result consistent with theoretical majority desires. Even
when a constitutional provision is involved, the judicial process is not
completely insulated from majoritarian pressures because the Constitu-
tion can be amended by a supermajority 7
PLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3-48 (1961). The Court, however, appears to have deter-
mined that the loss of esteem which would accompany its actions in Naim v. Naim was preferable
to the likely political repercussions of invalidating Virginia's miscegenation law in the post-Brown
climate, where it had already been predicted that school desegregation would lead to "mongreliza-
tion of the race." A. BICKEL, supra note 64, at 174.
75 Cf Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28 (1977) (suggesting
that sensitivity to majority desires is likely to increase, rather than decrease, the political nature of
the judiciary).
76 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. These provisions are intended to promote judicial independence.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 49; Kaufman, The Es-
sence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 686 (1980). Although life tenure does
not absolutely preclude removal of a federal judge, it may well preclude removal by any means
other than through the cumbersome process of impeachment compelled by art. II, § 4 of the
Constitution. See L. TRIBE, supra, at 49 n.5. See generally R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973). Some proposals have been made to remove federal judges by
a process other than impeachment, but the constitutionality of the proposals is uncertain. See L.
TRIBE, supra, § 3-6, at 49 n.5.
77 Any constitutionally mandated decision of the Supreme Court is subject to direct revision
for purely political reasons through the constitutional amendment process. See supra note 44.
That process has been used successfully to overturn unpopular decisions on four occasions. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 6, § 3-6, at 51 n.8. In addition, the majority can affect judicial decisions in
more subtle ways. For example, the political contexts giving rise to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), see supra note 6, and Naim v. Naim, see supra note 74, suggest that tacit
political considerations can be dispositive in cases pending before the Supreme Court. Congres-
sional control of the budget can also be used to exert political pressure on the Court. Moreover,
Congress has-at least nominally-the power to regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts,
Sheldon v. Sill 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). But see Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953)
(suggesting that the power of Congress to regulate federal court jurisdiction is less than absolute),
reprinted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 330-60. The mere introduction of a bill to
restrict federal court jurisdiction is likely to exert some degree of political pressure on the Court.
For a list of such bills introduced in the 97th Congress, see Sager, supra note 58, at 18-19 nn.3-5.
Further, political considerations surely play an important role in the process of selecting federal
judges-a process that requires both nomination by a popularly elected President and confirmation
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It is also inaccurate to assert that the judicial function is counter-
majoritarian.78 As a society, we identify constitutional principles and
the values they reflect as being so important that we wish to have a less
political branch of government serve as their guardian. We ask the
courts to monitor our activities and to tell us when those activities are
inconsistent with our fundamental principles. We do this precisely so
that our principles will not be sacrificed in the heat of political contro-
versy. As long as the majority continues to agree that such a strategy
constitutes a desirable method of safeguarding fundamental values, the
judicial process cannot be viewed as countermajoritarian; rather it is
extramajoritarian: the majority agrees that supervision of its fundamen-
tal values should be removed from direct majority control.
Perceived legitimacy is essential to the judiciary's function as an
expositor of constitutional norms. Because the public perceives the court
as a nonpolitical, countermajoritarian body, the judiciary must be espe-
cially cognizant of conditions that might jeopardize its creditability. In
this regard, the judiciary will be forced to monitor and respond to the
political climate in which it operates. The importance of maintaining
institutional legitimacy, therefore, serves as a formidable constraint on a
court's use of discretion in expounding statutory and constitutional
principles.
Because of the constraints under which the judiciary operates, it is
better equipped than the more political branches of government to per-
form an expository governmental function and to oversee the develop-
ment of our fundamental principles. For example, if Congress, in 1954,
had decided to desegregate public schools through legislation, public op-
position might well have resulted in prompt repeal of the desegregation
laws. Because the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education7
9
was able to explain convincingly that society could no longer maintain
segregated schools and purport to adhere to the principle of equality,
the abolition of de jure segregation has endured. Moreover, as a result
of such exposition, society has progressed not only beyond acceptance of
segregated public school education, but beyond tolerance of virtually all
racially based legislative classifications.80
by a popularly elected Senate. See US. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 2.
78 Professor Tribe has made a similar observation through a comparison with certain empiri-
cal findings contained in the literature of experimental psychology. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6,
§ 1-7, at 9-11; see also id. § 3-6, at 47-52.
- 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See supra note 55.
so See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also supra note 55.
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D. Support for the Expository Model
The creation and operation of the federal judiciary are more com-
prehensible under an expository model of adjudication than they are
under the traditional, dispute-resolution model. The special indepen-
dence accorded article III judges can be better understood as safeguard-
ing exposition than as protecting disputants seeking redress of injuries.
Moreover, recent Supreme Court development of the doctrine of finality
supports the expository model, but is difficult to explain under the dis-
pute-resolution model. The prospective nature of many landmark Su-
preme Court decisions also betrays a predominant interest in exposition
rather than dispute resolution.
1. Exposition as the Basis for Article III
Judicial Independence
Article III of the Constitution vests federal judges with a substan-
tial degree of independence. Federal judges are given life tenure and
their salaries cannot be reduced while they hold office.$' These protec-
tions are typically thought to protect both individual judges and the
judiciary as an institution from interference by the other branches of
government.82 The need for judicial independence stems from the im-
portant federal interests that underlie the enumerated categories of
cases to which the federal judicial power extends.8
81 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See id. Correspondingly, judicial immunity doctrines can be viewed as according a measure
of protection from retaliation by disappointed private litigants. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1871); Kaufman, supra note 76, at 692.
Article III provides in pertinent part:
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of an-
other State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The enumerated categories of proceedings arguably can be divided into
two groups differentiated by the source of the federal interest. "Cases" identifies those proceedings
in which the United States has a strong interest because of the nature of the law in-
volved-federal, admiralty or maritime. "Controversies" identifies those proceedings in which the
United States has a strong interest because of the identity of one or more of the parties. Cf THE
FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton). This symmetry is broken only by the extension of article III
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The need for judicial independence is more easily explained under
the expository model than under the dispute-resolution model of adju-
dication. Although orderly dispute resolution is important to society,
and unbiased arbiters are necessary for the effective operation of dis-
pute-resolution tribunals, the article III provisions concerning judicial
independence do not guard against the types of threats to independence
that are likely to impair resolution of disputes-at least not in modern
times." Those provisions are directed at threats to independence posed
by other branches of government8e 5 rather than the threats of bias with
which a private litigant would be concerned under the traditional
model of adjudication. In fact, it now appears that due process rarely, if
ever, requires that the safeguard of article III independence be accorded
an individual disputant, even when something as important as her or
his liberty is at stake.86 Most disputes could be resolved by article I
courts,87 or by state courts not subject to article III safeguards. More-
jurisdiction to "cases" affecting ambassadors and other foreign officials. Because the interest of the
United States in proceedings to which such officials are parties probably results more from their
status as foreign ministers than from the nature of the law likely to be applied, article III might
well have termed proceedings involving those officials "controversies" rather that "cases." Note,
however, that principles of international law, such as diplomatic immunity, could be dispositive in
proceedings involving foreign ministers, thereby preserving the offered distinction between "cases"
and "controversies."
Such a distinction suggests that the framers may well have intended the terms to have differ-
ent meanings. Perhaps "controversies"---connoting some adversary relationship-were required
only when party status served as the source of the federal interest, while any "case"-whether or
not of an adversary nature-was deemed sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction simply because a
federal law was likely to be construed. The Supreme Court, however, has not treated the "case"
and "controversy" requirements as distinct. Rather, it has evolved a single "case or controversy"
requirement embodying the concept of justiciability, which-measured by the concept of injury,
see infra note 130-serves as the "irreducible minimum" for article III jurisdiction. See Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911); see
also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, it seems clear that all of the "cases" and "controversies" enumerated in article III do
impinge upon some important federal interest.
Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); Neuborne, supra note 75, at 1127-28 (sug-
gesting that life tenure does enhance the protection of individual rights).
" True, the life-tenure provision, U.S. CONST. art. III § 1, can be accounted for as an effort
to insulate federal judges from popular retaliation for their decisions-as opposed to retaliation by
a coordinate branch-by making it unnecessary for them to run for reelection. Such a motive,
however, does not explain the inclusion of a provision protecting judicial salaries from reduction.
See id.
" See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); . United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 678-83 (1980); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45-47 (1932).
s7 For a forcefully articulated contrary view, asserting that article III itself, rather than the
due process clause, limits the scope of judicial activities that can be undertaken by article I courts,
see Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts Are
Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297 (1981).
An article I court is a tribunal created by Congress pursuant to some power other than its
art. 1, § 8, cl. 9 power to create article III courts. Arguably, all administrative agencies possessing
adjudicatory powers are article I courts. Article I judges do not possess the constitutionally based
independence of article III judges, because the Constitution does not accord them life tenure or
salary protection. As a result, despite Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (upholding
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over, private litigants are actively encouraged to utilize alternative
methods of dispute resolution, such as arbitration, that do not offer
such generous measures of independence."
Viewing the judicial function as primarily expository, the need for
article III independence becomes evident. Although primarily private
disputes are unlikely to spark the interest of a coordinate branch of
government, primarily public disputes could well produce such a result.
The circumstances surrounding the Dred Scott " decision provide
a particularly striking example. Nominally, Dred Scott presented the
question of whether a particular person held as a slave was entitled to
freedom under the Missouri Compromise enacted by Congress in 1820.
The suit was between the slave and his owner, but the case is famous
because of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on congressional
power to prohibit slavery.90 Although the Court held that it lacked ju-
risdiction to entertain Dred Scott's suit because Scott was not a "citi-
zen" for diversity purposes, Chief Justice Taney, nevertheless, went on
to conclude that Congress's Missouri Compromise was unconstitu-
tional.9 1 Congress had hoped that the Compromise would help to re-
solve the volatile slavery issue, and there is evidence that the President
felt strongly enough about the subject matter of the suit to attempt to
influence the Chief Justice." It is unlikely, however, that either branch
had any interest in the personal fate of Dred Scott. As the case illus-
trates, it is the Court's expository function, more than its dispute-reso-
lution role, that is likely to spark the interest of other branches of gov-
ernment in a way that might tempt them to interfere with judicial
independence.93
criminal conviction by an article I court against a challenge by the defendant that he had a right to
be tried by an article III court for violation of a District of Columbia law enacted by Congress),
the degree to which article I courts can decide cases falling within the scope of article III remains
unclear. For a recent Supreme Court decision adding to the confusion, see Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
" Where private disputes are involved, many advocate greater reliance on nonjudicial meth-
ods of dispute resolution. Such advocates include Chief Justice Warren Burger, consumer advocate
Ralph Nader, The Department of Justice, The American Bar Association, and The Ford Founda-
tion. See Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905 (1979) (symposium on alternate methods of dis-
pute resolution); see also Fiss, supra note 1, at 30-31. See generally Pivate Alternatives to the
Judicial Process, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (1979) (proceedings of a seminar on alternate methods of
dispute resolution).
D red Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
O See S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 507-08 (1980).
' 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 427, 430-31, 452.
"See S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 90, at 507-08.
" Where matters of public concern are before the courts, the danger of interference with
judicial independence is greatly increased. The "Watergate" era provides examples of instances in
which the Nixon Administration may have attempted to influence ongoing judicial proceedings.
John Dean's Senate testimony in the Watergate hearings indicates that the Nixon White House
may have exerted pressure on Judge Charles R. Richey to delay proceedings in a post-break-in
civil suit filed by the Democratic National Committee in order to minimize the adverse impact that
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2. The Finality Doctrine
Related to article III independence is the doctrine of finality,
which also seeks to prohibit the other branches of government from
interfering with properly exercised judicial functions." * Under this doc-
trine, the judiciary is precluded from exercising jurisdiction if it ap-
pears that another branch of government may change the result that the
judiciary decrees. 5 Consistent with the traditional model, the finality
doctrine provides a measure of assurance that a judgment redressing the
injury of a victorious plaintiff will not be undone by another branch of
government." Although such a view of the finality doctrine is consistent
with the dispute-resolution model, it is not consistent with the case law.
In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,9" the Supreme Court
substantially undercut the doctrine of finality as formulated above,
when, at the insistence of Congress, it permitted relitigation by the
same parties of an issue that had already been "finally" resolved by the
Supreme Court in a prior action. 8 In order to explain that result, the
the suit would have on the President's chances of reelection in 1972. See Hearings Before the
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities-Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I,
Book 3, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 958 (June 25, 1973).
On April 3, 1973, President Nixon's assistant John Ehrlichman met with Judge William M.
Byrne at the President's home in San Clemente, Cal. to discuss Byrne's possible appointment to
the post of Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The meeting occurred while Judge
Byrne was presiding over the "Pentagon Papers" trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo-a
matter which was of great presidential concern. Judge Byrne ultimately declared a mistrial based
on other cited government misconduct. See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1973, at 28, col. 6; id. July 27,
1973, at 10, col. 6; see also WATERGATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE 186, 188, 191 (E. Knappman
ed. 1973).
" In Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), five of the six Justices of the Supreme
Court, in separate opinions issued in their capacities as circuit justices, adopted the view that
Congress could not require the federal judiciary to take actions that were nonfinal in that they
were subject to revision by the executive. Id. Issuance of nonfinal decisions was viewed as inher-
ently nonjudicial, thereby abrogating the constitutional separation of powers.
" Id. But see United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), discussed infra
text accompanying note 97. Curiously the finality doctrine prevents interference with the judiciary
pot by imposing a direct prohibition on the representative branches, but by imposing a limitation
on the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary-the branch to be protected.
" In this regard, the doctrine of finality bears some resemblence to the doctrine of res judi-
cata. Both doctrines can be viewed as measures of protection to litigants who obtain favorable
judgments.
" 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
" Id. at 395-97, 406-07. In Sioux Nation, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine
whether Congress had the power to provide for de novo review of a previously adjudicated claim
asserted by the Sioux nation against the United States. In 1868, the United States signed the Fort
Laramie Treaty with the Sioux, giving the Sioux occupation rights to certain land, including the
Black Hills of South Dakota. Pursuant to the terms of the Treaty, the concurrence of 75% of the
members of the tribe was required for future alienation of the land granted under the Treaty.
Shortly thereafter, gold was discovered in the Black Hills and the United States successfully "re-
negotiated" the treaty with 10% of the tribe's members. Under the revised agreement, the Sioux
exchanged their right to the Black Hills for subsistence rations. Congress enacted the revised
agreement into law in 1877. See id. at 374-84.
The bulk of the Sioux Nation claimed that the 1877 revision violated, inter alia, the 75%
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traditional model would have to tolerate a considerable amount of
strain.99 It is easy, however, to account for the Court's decision under
the expository model.
In Sioux Nation, the Supreme Court undermined finality by per-
mitting relitigation of a substantive issue of constitutional law on the
alienation provision of the original Treaty, and that the revision, therefore, constituted an uncon-
stitutional "taking" of the tribe's property without just compensation. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity, however, precluded the tribe from asserting this claim against the United States. When,
in 1920, Congress responded to mounting political pressure to deal more fairly with Indian claims
by waiving sovereign immunity the Sioux filed suit in the Court of Claims. Ultimately, in 1942,
that court rejected the tribe's claim, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to question the ade-
quacy of the compensation given the Sioux in exchange for the Black Hills. In 1943, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See id. at 384-85.
Political pressure continued to mount, and in 1946, Congress created the Indian Claims
Commission to deal with grievances such as those asserted by the Sioux. The Commission reexam-
ined the tribe's claim for just compensation, and ruled in 1974 that the 1877 Treaty revision, in
fact, constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment, thereby entitling the tribe
to 5% interest on 17.1 million dollars over 100 years. On appeal, however, the Court of Claims
held that its earlier 1942 decision barred reexamination of the claim under the doctrine of res
judicata. Once again, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See id. at 384-88.
In 1978, Congress enacted another statute, this time providing for de novo reexamination by
the Court of Claims of the "taking" claim, without regard to the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel. In 1979, after the statutorily prescribed'reconsideration, the Court of Claims,
en bane, held that the 1877 Treaty revision had constituted a "taking." See id. at 388-89. Review
of that 1979 decision of the Court of Claims was before the Supreme Court in Sioux Nation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims decision, rejecting two constitutional argu-
ments that had been offered to bar relitigation of the "taking" claim. First, it had been asserted
that the doctrine of finality rendered the 1975 and 1942 decisions of the Court of Claims incapable
of judicial reexamination. Second, the 1978 Act of Congress directing the Court of Claims to
disregard the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, was challenged as invalid under the
doctrine of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), a case that is customarily
viewed as prohibiting Congress from prescribing a rule of decision in a case pending before the
courts, because the statute prescribed resolution of the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues.
See Souix Nation, 448 U.S. at 392-407. The Supreme Court held that neither doctrine was of-
fended because the statute did not direct the Court of Claims to enter any particular ruling on the
merits of the "taking" issue, but rather authorized the Sioux to present to the court for enforce-
ment a new legal right created by the statute. See id. at 406-07.
" In Sioux Nation, the Court equated the doctrine of finality with the doctrine of res judi-
cata and held that, because the United States was the beneficiary of the prior judgment at issue, it
was free to waive the benefits of those doctrines through congressional enactment of a statute
authorizing relitigation. See 448 U.S. at 395-407. If equation of the two doctrines is valid, the
result can be explained in traditional, dispute-resolution terms: the prevailing party in a dispute
simply chose not to take advantage of a beneficial and potentially dispositive doctrine.
The problem with this explanation is that the two doctrines are not identical. Res judicata is
subject to waiver because it exists for the convenience of the litigants and the courts. See id.; c. id.
at 432 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Unlike res judicata, however, the doctrine of finality is juris-
dictional, reflecting an article III limitation on the scope of the judicial power that is rooted in the
doctrine of separation of powers. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). Accordingly,
finality is not properly subject to waiver-not even by Congress. Therefore, the result in Sioux
Nation cannot be adequately explained by equating the two doctrines.
The Court's disposition of the Klein rule-of-decision issue, see supra note 98, is equally un-
satisfying. The Court held that Congress had not impermissibly prescribed a rule of decision,
because it had not prescribed the result on the merits. See 448 U.S. at 406-07. Congress did,
however, prescribe the result with respect to the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues. More-
over, the prescribed resolution of those issues proved to control the outcome of the entire case. The
Sioux nation ultimately won the case, but only due to congressional prescription of the threshold
issues.
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merits. The federal judiciary, however, had not been told by Congress
either how to resolve the merits 00 or, more importantly, how its opin-
ion was to read. In fact, the court of Claims was perfectly free to reis-
sue the original opinion word-for-word if it so desired.10 ' The finality
of the prior decision was completely undermined in traditional, dispute-
resolution terms because the United States was deprived of a "right" to
which the court had found it to be entitled."0 ' Under an expository
model, however, such an abrogation of finality is inconsequential. The
type of independence that is pertinent to the expository model is pre-
served as long as a representative branch of government does not at-
tempt to usurp the judicial function of stating what the Constitution
means-of expounding. Because no such usurpation occurred in Sioux
Nation, the doctrine of finality was not offended.
In essence, the expository model renders the requirement of final-
ity nonexistent, leaving Congress free to compel relitigation of any case
as long as it does not prescribe a constitutional rule of decision."'
However, there does not appear to be any need for a bare finality re-
quirement, as distinct from a prohibition on congressional prescription
of constitutional rules of decision. Properly formulated res judicata
rules should be adequate to protect any interests that the parties have
in avoiding relitigation. Because the expository function requires reex-
position in subsequent cases as circumstances change or new considera-
100 But see supra note 99.
101 See 448 U.S. at 407 ("[t]hat court was left completely free to reaffirm its [earlier] judg-
ment . . ").
10 One might argue that no harm was done by Congress in requiring relitigation of the
merits of the "taking" claim. See supra note 98. Precisely the same finality and rule-of-decision
analyses would apply, however, if Congress had required relitigation after an initial decision in
favor of the Sioux. Proper application of those separation-of-powers based doctrines does not turn
on who wins and who loses. It follows from Sioux Nation that if private litigants are to be pro-
tected from congressional abrogation of federal court judgments entered in their favor, that protec-
tion must come from the due process clause or some other provision of the Constitution-not from
article III. For a discussion of whether due process accords such protection, see HART & WECHS-
LER, supra note 10, at 316-24.
'03 In statutory cases, the rule prohibiting Congress from prescribing a rule of decision in
cases pending before the courts, see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), is also
arguably unnecessary insofar as it relates to finality concerns, although under the expository model
the rule-of-decision prohibition has a firm basis in the separation-of-powers preference for legisla-
tive generality, c. supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
With regard to the finality aspect of the rule-of-decision prohibition, Congress is always free,
within the bounds of due process and other constitutional restrictions, to change the result of a
statutory adjudication merely by changing the underlying statute. Under this view Congress
should arguably be able to direct a court to construe a statute in a way that would produce the
same result. But see supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text (discussing legislative generality).
Note that under this view, the Klein case itself, which was a case of statutory construction, ap-
pears to be incorrectly decided.
In constitutional cases, however, the Klein doctrine serves the function of precluding Congress
from expounding constitutional values where Congress cannot change the underlying substantive
law, the Constitution itself.
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tions emerge, the very notion of "finality" is inconsistent with the na-
ture of exposition.
The only interesting question that remains is whether a finality
doctrine is required in order to prohibit reexposition in a case that has
already been adjudicated. As long as the interests of the parties in pre-
serving the results of the original adjudication are adequately protected
through the res judicata and due process doctrines, and Congress has
not prescribed a constitutional rule of decision, even reexposition in a
previously adjudicated case, while unlikely,10' is unobjectionable absent
possible efficiency concerns."' In accordance with the prescriptions of
expository adjudication, the finality doctrine seems to have been aban-
doned defensibly in Sioux Nation.
3. Prospective Judicial Decisions
Further support for the expository model is provided by the pro-
spective nature of many well-known judicial decisions. The dispute-res-
olution model instructs courts to operate retrospectively, limiting the
scope of their opinions to that which is necessary to protect legal
rights,106 but that is certainly not what courts do. A large part of what
courts do is craft opinions-like the Marbury opinion 107-that are con-
sciously designed to have prospective, rather than retrospective effect.108
The judiciary does more than resolve disputes. As a practical mat-
ter, no judiciary vested with the degree of procedural formality that we
presently find desirable could bear the burden of resolving even a frac-
tion of the disputes that arise in our society. Instead, judicial opinions
serve as precedents, precluding the need for future adjudication of simi-
I" It is difficult to perceive why reitigation under such circumstances would be desirable.
The Sioux Nation case, however, falls within the described circumstances, and Congress did desire
relitigation in that case. It may be that political considerations made relitigation of the merits
desirable. Perhaps an outright congressional grant of the money claimed by the Sioux nation
would have been too politically unpopular to command a majority in each House of Congress. A
strategy under which the judiciary would order satisfaction of the tribe's claim, with Congress
acting only to remove a legal technicality, may well have been politically more popular. Such a
strategy would raise interesting questions concerning the degree to which Congress properly can
take actions designed to reduce its own political accountability.
1I8 Congressionally compelled relitigation could become quite objectionable if used merely as
a means of coercing a court to reach a particular result on the merits. This might be the case if
Congress continually required relitigation after the court repeatedly reached the same result in a
particular case. At least in constitutional cases, such congressional pressure might well offend the
doctrine of separation of powers by undermining judicial independence. It is difficult, however, to
distinguish between such impermissible pressure and the type of political pressure that is desirable
in order to give the judiciary the proper degree of political accountability. See supra notes 75-78
and accompanying text.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
107 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
1'" See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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lar disputes. The precedents send signals to absentees, permitting them
to structure their transactions to avoid potential disputes and permitting
out-of-court settlement of many disputes that, nevertheless, do arise.'
Because of the importance of precedent, most judges do not issue opin-
ions without first giving substantial consideration to the prospective ef-
fect that their opinions will have on the conduct of absentees."' In fact,
the United States Supreme Court considers precedential impact in de-
termining whether certiorari should be granted."'
Some of the more famous decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court belie the accuracy of the traditional model of adjudication. In
Brown v. Board of Education,"2 the Court certainly was preoccupied
with the prospective impact of its decision. The Topeka Board of Edu-
109 One explanation for why decisions establishing a new principle of law are iot given full
retroactive effect is that at the time the new principle is announced it is too late to affect behavior
that has already occurred. Accordingly, limited retroactive effect is often accorded new principles
of law where it is still not too late to affect behavior prospectively.
For example, in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Supreme Court declined to
give full retroactive effect to the four-year-old rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), requir-
ing state courts to exclude from criminal trials evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. Rather, the Court chose to apply the exclusionary rule only in cases where the state crimi-
nal proceedings had not yet become final when Mapp was decided. See 381 U.S. at 622.
Presumably, the exclusionary rule was applied only where it would have some prospective impact
upon the behavior of the state courts.
The degree of retroactivity given by the Court to the exclusionary rule falls to coincide with
one of the primary purposes that the Court found to be served by the rule. The Court stated that
the exclusionary rule was intended to deter the police from violating fourth amendment rights. Id.
at 636-37. Under that rationale, the rule should have been applied only in cases where potential
police misconduct had yet to occur. Cf id. at 637. A deterrent does not serve its purpose if those
whom it is intended to deter are unaware of it.
However, the Court also alluded to another purpose served by the exclusionary rule-that of
protecting the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 637. Presumably, the judicial process is
tainted by knowing reliance on unconstitutionally seized evidence. Such reliance could be avoided
without undue administrative burden in proceedings which had not yet become final. This expla-
nation of the Court's actions in Linkletter still places that case within the scope of the suggested
principle that courts are motivated primarily by a desire to affect prospective behavior. The gen-
eral question of how offered justifications for the exclusionary rule bear upon the distinction be-
tween the dispute-resolution and expository models of adjudication is discussed infra note 116 and
accompanying text.
"' The classic example of this arises in the context of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule which the Court has held to exist because of its deterrent effect rather than by constitutional
compulsion. See infra note 116.
Professor Brilmayer has suggested that article III justiciability ought to turn, in part, upon
the degree to which unrepresented absentees are likely to be affected by a court's decisions, partic-
ularly to the extent that such effects are a factor in the orderly operation of stare decisis. See L.
Brilmayer, supra note 10, at 306-15. Professor Tushnet disagrees, see Tushnet, The Sociology of
Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980), arguing not only
that such determinations are too elusive to serve as a basis for justiciability doctrines, see id. at
1708-13, but questioning the very desirability of using justiciability rules to resolve fundamental
legal issues relating to self-determination, which would be better addressed in connection with the
merits. See id. at 1724. Both views, however, seem to rely on the premise that the important
feature of a judicial decision is its prospective impact.
I' See U.S. Sup. CT. R. 17.1(c).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cation was not simply ordered to permit the plaintiff to attend an inte-
grated school. Rather, the entire school system was ordered desegre-
gated-something arguably unnecessary to resolve the plaintiff's
dispute and, therefore, improper under the dispute-resolution model."'
Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona"1 4 the Court issued a prospective rule
designed not to dispose of the Miranda case itself but, rather, to affect
future police conduct." 5 Likewise, if the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule is viewed as a rule of deterrence rather than a rule that is
constitutionally compelled," 6 the rule's very existence offends the dis-
11 See Brown v. Board of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). It is possible to explain Brown in
dispute-resolution terms. If the equal protection clause gives blacks the right to attend meaning-
fully integrated schools, as opposed to predominately white schools, the plaintiffs rights could be
protected only by fully integrating the school that she attended.
114 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, a 5-4 majority announced the fifth amendment exclu-
sionary rule. Pursuant to Miranda, inculpatory statements made by criminal defendants are pre-
sumed to have been obtained in violation of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination unless, prior to making such statements, the defendant was advised: (1) that he or
she had a right to remain silent; (2) that any statements made could be used as evidence against
the defendant; and (3) that the defendant had a right to counsel, even if he or she were unable to
afford one. If, after receiving those warnings, a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
or her Miranda-based rights, inculpatory statements were admissible at the defendant's trial.
However, in the absence of either a Miranda warning, or an intelligent waiver of Miranda rights,
inculpatory statements could not constitutionally be admitted into evidence at the defendant's trial.
See id. at 478-79. Miranda is noteworthy for its lack of concern with whether, as a factual matter,
particular defendants were or were not coerced into making inculpatory statements. The presence
or absence of a fifth amendment violation turned directly on whether a Miranda warning had
been given and a knowing and intelligent waiver made. See id. at 491-99.
"I The only way to account for Miranda, as well as for the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule, discussed infra note 116, under the dispute-resolution model is to conclude that the exclusion-
ary rule is coextensive with the constitutional violation at issue, and that the tarnished integrity of
the judicial process that would result from introduction of the subject evidence would deprive the
very defendants before the court of their constitutional rights. As is discussed infra note 116,
however, the Supreme Court has adopted the view that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
and the fourth amendment are not coextensive.
"' The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment requires exclusion from criminal
trials of evidence obtained in violation of that amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961); c. Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 393-94, 398 (1914). More recently, however, the Court has stated that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule is not compelled by the fourth amendment. Rather, it constitutes a
judicially developed, functional doctrine, designed to effectuate fourth amendment concerns by de-
terring police misconduct. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); c Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976). If the exclusionary rule is merely a deterrent which
implements but is not compelled by the fourth amendment, it is difficult to identify the source of
the Supreme Court's power to impose the rule on the states as it did in Mapp. C Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1949). For a particularly sophisticated discussion of the constitu-
tional status of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in light of its deterrence function, see
Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in
Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 449-59 (1980); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 543 n.8 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Moreover, if the rule is merely a deterrent, designed to have prospective impact, such a rule
cannot be squared with the dispute-resolution model. When the rule is applied, the defendant's
conviction is reversed not because of any right that the defendant possesses, but solely as an inci-
dent to the court's desire to affect future police conduct. Although such motivation properly can be
attributed to an expository judiciary, it turns the dispute-resolution model on its head. See gener-
ally supra notes 57 & 115.
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pute-resolution model because it regulates future conduct instead of
narrowly disposing of the case before the court.
Although the legitimacy of these decisions may be questioned on
other grounds,""' they are not objectionable simply because the Court
was concerned primarily with the prospective impact that the decisions
would have. Nevertheless, those decisions are inconsistent with the
traditional model. Because the only limitation that the traditional model
imposes upon judicial conduct is that of avoiding actions unnecessary to
resolution of the dispute before the court, that limitation cannot be ig-
nored without leaving the judiciary completely unconstrained."" The
traditional model is unable to tolerate even a small amount of prospec-
tive exposition because it offers no basis for determining when such
exposition would be proper. Some exposition is manifestly desirable,
however, and a viable model of adjudication is needed to place proper
limits upon the expository function of courts.
It is descriptively artificial, as well as demeaning to the judiciary,
to suggest-as does the traditional model-that exposition is only a by-
product of dispute resolution. Courts do not incidentally expound prin-
ciples of law solely to aid resolution of particular disputes. Rather,
courts resolve particular disputes as part of the process of properly per-
forming their governmental function of expounding principles. If any-
thing is incidental, it is resolution of the particular dispute that is used
as a vehicle for exposition. The exposition itself is central. Brown v.
Board of Education did not effect a profound social change because
Linda Carol Brown wished to attend a desegregated school. Other stu-
dents had possessed the same desire before her but were told that sepa-
rate could be equal. 9 Rather, Linda Brown was permitted to attend a
desegregated school because the judiciary foresaw shifting social atti-
tudes that would support profound social change.12 The value of
1,7 For example, it is possible to object to Miranda on separation-of-powers grounds because
the Supreme Court was engaged in legislative policymaking. See infra text accompanying notes
205-57.
"06 The justiciability doctrines traditionally relied upon to constrain the judiciary are rooted
in the concept of an "injury" emanating from a dispute. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying
text. When resolution of the dispute ceases to be the court's objective, the traditional justiciability
limitations cease to function in a coherent manner. Professor Sager has recognized the all-or-
nothing quality of justiciability doctrines under the traditional model, characterizing the issue
posed by recent liberal justiciability decisions as a choice between the Marbury model and "the
Abyss." See Sager, supra note 10, at 1377-81.
1'9 See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1927) (Chinese high school student
denied right to attend whites-only high school); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175
U.S. 528, 543 (1899) (black parents unable to send children to whites-only high school); Lehew v.
Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551-52, 15 S.W. 765, 766 (1891) (injunction forbidding black children
from attending whites-only school upheld); . Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
"0 Cf Fiss, supra note 1, at 5-17 (suggesting that the important purpose of adjudication is to
give concrete meaning to our public values).
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equality embodied in the equal protection clause could no longer be
reconciled with segregated public schools. This view of the judiciary
gives it an affirmative, coequal function to serve in the operation of
government, but it also poses certain dangers-dangers to which the
law of justiciability properly should be directed.
III. THE SAFEGUARDS OF JUSTICIABILITY
The law of justiciability is designed to confine the judiciary to
proper judicial activity, as contemplated by article III of the Constitu-
tion. The text of article III extends the federal judicial power to
"cases" ahd "controversies.1 12 Although those terms appear in a por-
tion of the Constitution that grants power to the judiciary, the Supreme
Court has construed them to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts,
generally prohibiting the issuance of advisory opinions.122 The criteria
used to determine whether a "case" or "controversy" exists collectively
comprise the concept of justiciability, or suitability for judicial resolu-
tion. 128  The components of justiciability are standing, ripeness, and
mootness, as well as the collusive-suit, finality, and political-question
doctrines.1 2 4 Because of their jurisdictional underpinning, justiciability
doctrines have acquired a heightened aura of constitutional gravity, al-
though it seems that the aura exaggerates the constitutional stature to
which the doctrines realistically are entitled.
1 25
Justiciability rules, predictably, tend to reflect prevailing views of
the proper judicial function.1 26 Accordingly, the present law of jus-
121 See supra note 83.
122 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
As has been mentioned supra note 83, a literal reading of article III does not particularly
support the Supreme Court's equation and construction of the "cases" and "controversies"
provisions.
'I See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).
124 See id.; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 64-241; see also G. GUNTHER, supra note
6, at 1604-07; L. TRIBE, supra note 6, §§ 3-9 to 3-29, at 52-112.
"' As is developed in the remainder of this Article, the constitutional components of jus-
ticiability are largely aspirational. It is difficult to identify any single case whose resolution by a
good-faith judiciary could fairly be called "unconstitutional."
1'" For example, compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) with United
States Civ. Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), both of
which involved preenforcement challenges by federal employees to the Hatch Act provision, 5
U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976), that prohibited them from actively engaging in political campaigns. In
Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that the employees' action for declaratory and injunctive relief
was not ripe in the absence of actual enforcement of the statute because no article III case or
controversy was present. 330 U.S. at 86-91. In so doing, the Court refused to adjudicate the
plaintiffs' claim that the mere existence of the Act impermissibly "chilled" the exercise of their
constitutional rights. Id. Although Letter Carriers presented the Court with virtually identical
facts, there the Court adjudicated the merits of the plaintiffs' anticipatory challenge without even
mentioning the article III ripeness or case-or-controversy requirements. The Court in Letter Car-
riers emphasized that an actual, rather than potential, injury was alleged. Any injury suffered,
however, whether actual or potential, would be identical in either case. The discrepancy between
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ticiability is designed to implement the traditional, dispute-resolution
model of adjudication. 127 Yet, the present law of justiciability is notori-
ously incoherent, 128 and serious scrutiny suggests that the incoherency
is due to adherence to the wrong model of adjudication. Because the
dispute-resolution model does not conform to society's expectations con-
cerning the process of adjudication,12 the doctrines evolved from that
model often produce unacceptable results. The expository model of ad-
judication, which more accurately reflects our expectations concerning
the judicial process, provides the basis for the development of a coher-
ent law of justiciability-a law that, in turn, guards against potential
abuse of the judiciary's expository function.
A. Justiciability and the Traditional Model
The touchstone of the Supreme Court's approach to justiciability
the Court's approach to ripeness in the two cases strongly suggests that prevailing views of jus-
ticiability had changed in the 26 years that had elapsed between the decisions in the two cases.
127 In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), the Court, discussing standing, stated:
Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question
of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is
on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has "a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, [369 U.S.] at 204, and whether the
dispute touches upon "the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, [300 U.S.] at 240-241.
This language appears to track the Marbury-based dispute-resolution model of adjudication.
See supra text accompanying notes 6-12. In Flast, however, the Court went on to hold that federal
taxpayers could, by virtue of their taxpayer status alone, satisfy article III limitations for the
purpose of challenging the constitutionality of a government program authorizing aid to parochial
schools. See 392 U.S. at 101.
Such a holding certainly is at odds with the traditional model's dispute-resolution function. If
one concedes that the merits properly were reached in Flast, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the dispute-resolution model cannot account for the full scope of desirable judicial activities.
12 Most critics of contemporary justiciability rules focus on the law of standing. Criticism
has ranged from the relatively mild assertion that "[gleneralizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as such," Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970), to the more pointed assertion that "the Supreme Court's law of standing remains cluttered,
confused, and contradictory." 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.18 (Supp. 1965).
Professor Freund has referred to the concept of standing as "among the most amorphous in the
entire domain of public law." Judicial Review: Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 498
(1966).
Professor Tushnet has cogently and systematically destroyed any vestiges of coherence that
might survive superficial scrutiny of standing, terming the doctrine "little more than a set of dis-
jointed rules dealing with a common subject," and emphasizing that "the law of standing lacks a
rational conceptual framework." Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
Doctrinal incoherence makes justiciability rules particularly susceptible to manipulation by
the courts-a fact that has been noted by jurists and commentators alike, see Tushnet, supra note
110, at 1705-06 nn.31-33, and such manipulation, of course, serves only to increase dissatisfaction
with the law of justiciability.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 24-120.
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has been "injury."13 0 The Court has frequently asserted that the article
III case-or-controversy limitation precludes judicial initiatives directed
at "generalized grievances,"1 ' and permits judicial redress of only ac-
tual or threatened "injury in fact. 18 2 Standing rules assure that the
plaintiff actually suffers the asserted injury;13 3 ripeness'" and moot-
ness 3 5 rules assure that the injury is ongoing at the time of adjudica-
tion; and resolution of collusive suits is .prohibited because friendly dis-
putes reflect no real injury. 3 6 Although finality requirements fit less
comfortably into an injury framework, they arguably can be understood
to assure the plaintiff that judicial redress of an injury will not subse-
quently be undermined by another branch of government.137 Only the
prohibition against judicial resolution of political questions relates more
to the nature of the legal issue raised than to the harm suffered by the
plaintiff.138 The injury-orientation of Supreme Court justiciability deci-
sions logically follows from the dispute-resolution model of adjudica-
tion: the presence of an injury reflects the presence of a dispute suffi-
ciently concrete for judicial resolution."3 9
A functional approach to justiciability under the traditional model
would focus on the likelihood of social disruption absent a receptive
judicial tribunal: suits posing a serious threat of disruption would be
justiciable, but those posing only a small threat of disruption would
I" See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)
("distinct and palpable injury" required); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17
(1973); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 6, §§ 3-17 to 3-20, at 79-92. A corollary to the injury
requirement necessary to the Marbury dispute-resolution model, see supra text accompanying
notes 6-12, is that the challenged conduct must cause the asserted injury in a way that renders a
favorable judicial decision on the merits likely to redress the injury. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at
72-78; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); see also L. TRIBE,
supra note 6, § 3-21, at 92-97. Recently, the Supreme Court has been quite strict in its adherence
to the causation and redressability requirements. See, eg., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614 (1973); see also infra text accompanying notes 143-73; cd Duke Power; Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dee. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
13 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106
(1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923); cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 731-41 (1972) (even under the federal Administrative Procedure Act's broad statutory
standing provision, parties must demonstrate that they themselves suffered injury).
1s" Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp., 397 U.S. 150, 151-54 (1970); Bar-
low v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1970); f. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41
(1972) (aesthetic or environmental harm, though noneconomic, may constitute "injury in fact").
23 See infra text accompanying notes 143-73.
1,4 See infra note 188.
18 See infra note 190.
1 See infra note 192.
IS See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
'3 See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
23, See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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not.140 Of course, the Supreme Court has never asserted such a theory
of justiciability. Instead, it has chosen to rely on a commonly under-
stood, intuitive concept of injury as the basis for its justiciability deter-
minations. 41 Although a commonly shared concept of injury once may
have existed, that no longer appears to be the case.1 42 One reason, then,
that Supreme Court justiciability decisions are unsatisfying is that the
concept of injury is too elusive and malleable to be of any use.
Supreme Court allegiance to the traditional model of adjudication
appears most strongly in the Court's standing decisions. The Supreme
Court has held that, as a matter of constitutional jurisdiction, federal
courts are empowered to entertairi only suits filed by a plaintiff with
standing; in the absence of standing no article III case or controversy
exists.1'" In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc.,'" the Court stated that article III standing doctrine required the
plaintiffs to possess a "'personal stake in the outcome of [a] contro-
versy,' ",145 measured by the presence of a "'distinct and palpable in-
jury' ,,146 with a "'fairly traceable' causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct."' 47 Demonstration of a
"distinct and palpable injury" can be viewed as effecting adherence to
the dispute-resolution model,1 46 and the causation requirement can be
understood as ensuring that judicial redress will actually remedy the
injury. Judicial action is thus limited to that which is necessary for
dispute resolution.
Early standing decisions equated "injury" with the concept of "le-
gal injury"-a violation of a legal right protected by common law or
140 It is tantalizing to flirt with such a construction. Arguably certain jurisdictional require-
ments, such as the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for federal court diversity jurisdic-
tion, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), distinguish between disputes that are likely to result in social
disruption if not resolved by a sophisticated, formalized process and those that are not. It is un-
likely, however, that the potential for social disruption would ultimately correlate very highly with
the amount of money involved in any particular lawsuit. People tend to have strong feelings about
their fundamental, nonmonetary rights, nonformal abrogation of which might well pose the danger
of social disruption.
141 The concept of injury has been expanded over the years to include legal and nonlegal,
economic and non-economic, and direct and attenuated injury without ever defining injury. See
infra text accompanying notes 149-55.
142 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 173-203.
145 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-101 (1968). Standing doctrine also encompasses a
nonconstitutional "nexus" component. See infra text accompanying notes 227-36.
1- 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
145 Id. at 72 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
146 438 U.S. at 72 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
247 438 U.S. at 72 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 261 (1977)).
148 See supra note 130. "Distinct" appears to mean particularized, thereby depriving plain-
tiffs of standing if they assert mere "generalized grievances." See supra note 131 and accompany-
ing text.
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statute.'49 Gradually, however, the concept of judicially cognizable in-
jury expanded to include interests other than those that were directly
protected by a common law or statutory provision. In Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,'"0 invasion of an eco-
nomic interest in freedom from competition was recognized as an "in-
jury in fact" even though it did not constitute a "legal injury." 15 Three
years later in United States v. SCRAP,'52 the Court held that the un-
differentiated, abstract interest of an ordinary citizen in environmental
protection constituted a cognizable injury.'5 Because the plaintiffs in
SCRAP were in no pertinent respects different from any other citizens,
the SCRAP decision dispensed with any meaningful notion of palpabil-
ity or redressability as a requirement for finding "injury in fact."'"
14, See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113,125 (1940); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v.
Tennesseee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). This conception of injury is based on a
circular definition: an injury is something that the law protects against, but, in determining
whether the law protects against something, one must ascertain whether it is an injury. Cf Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); infra note 174. Even Chief Justice
Marshall seems to have internalized the equation between injury and invasion of a legally pro-
tected right, as evidenced by his reference in Marbury to damnum absque injuria, or loss without
injury, as a loss upon which the judiciary will not act. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163-64 (1803).
150 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
151 In Data Processing, companies that sold data processing services to businesses challenged
the statutory validity of a ruling issued by the Comptroller of the Currency which permitted
national banks to sell similar services to their customers as an incident to their banking activities.
The challenged ruling allegedly subjected the plaintiffs to competition by national banks that the
plaintiffs would not have had to face in the absence of the challenged ruling. Although the plain-
tiffs suffered no "legal injury," because they were viewed as having no legally protected rights
under the subject statute, the Supreme Court found that the economic injury with which the
plaintiffs were threatened was a sufficient basis for standing. Id. at 152. In the process, the Court
abandoned the legal-right test for standing, finding that it related more to the merits that it did to
standing inquiries. Id. at 153.
152 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
15 In SCRAP, an ad hoc organization of five law students, formed apparently for the pur-
pose of instituting the subject litigation, challenged the statutory validity of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission's failure to suspend a scheduled railroad freight surcharge, arguing that the
agency's action was invalid because the agency had not prepared an environmental impact state-
ment prior to deciding not to suspend the proposed rate increase. The plaintiff organization based
its claim to standing on the alleged economic, recreational, and aesthetic harm that its members
would suffer if the increase were permitted to go into effect. The plaintiffs reasoned that the
resultant rate structure would discourage the use of recyclable materials, thereby promoting addi-
tional exploitation of raw materials, which, in turn, would not only increase the prices that
SCRAP members would have to pay for finished products, but also would affect adversely the
forests, rivers, mountains, and other natural resources in the Washington, D.C. area, in a way
that would interfere with the members' enjoyment of those resources. Id. at 672-83. The Supreme
Court found these claims to allege "injury in fact," thereby serving as an adequate basis for stand-
ing. See id. at 686-90.
'" The Court, however, specifically rejected both the argument that the alleged chain of
causation was too attenuated ever to be proved, 412 U.S. at 688-90, and the suggestion that stand-
ing should be limited to those who are "significantly" affected by an agency's action, id. at 689
n.14. It is unlikely that SCRAP and its members made allegations that could not, in good faith,
have been made by any member of the public. See Eckhardt, Citizens' Groups and Standing, 51
N.D.L. REV. 359, 365 (1974); Wolff, Standing to Sue: Capricious Application of Direct Injury
Standard, 20 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 663, 667-72 (1976). Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (indi-
vidual taxpayer may have standing to challenge federal spending program). But see Valley Forge
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Nevertheless, rather than dispense with the injury requirement alto-
gether, the Court went to great pains to stretch the concept so that it
could be satisfied by the plaintiffs in that case, yet still be retained for
future use.
1 55
For a time it appeared that SCRAP was merely the most recent in
a line of cases signifying a general liberalization in the Supreme Court
law of standing, 156 with a concomitant increase in judicial activism.
Two years after SCRAP was decided, however, the Supreme Court, in
Warth v. Seldin,5 v denied standing to an array of plaintiffs challenging
the constitutionality of a restrictive municipal zoning ordinance. The
Court held that the alleged injury might not be eliminated by a
favorable decision on the merits and denied the plaintiffs' standing. "
The decision was surprising because victims of alleged economic harm
and racial discrimination typically had been thought to suffer an injury
that was cognizable for standing purposes. 59
The Supreme Court's increasingly blurred vision of injury was
clouded further in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp.'6 0 There, the plaintiffs' injury seemed identical
in all pertinent respects to the injury suffered by the plaintiffs in
Warth; yet standing was granted.' The following year, in Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,"2 the Supreme Court
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)
(standing denied where taxpayer challenged HEW actions; limited Flast to challenges directed at
congressional action).
"' Cf Wolff, supra note 154, at 667.
16 See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV.
645, 646 (1973) (discussing the line of cases that preceded SCRAP).
"' 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
16 Id. at 502-08. In his opinion for the five-member majority of the Court, Justice Powell
recited each plaintiff's asserted injury in excruciating detail, demonstrating in every instance that
some contingency could be imagined that would render a favorable decision less than completely
satisfactory. See id. at 502-17.
The opinion exudes artificiality. Few could read it without seriously questioning why the
factors discussed by the Court should have had any bearing on the plaintiffs' standing. Moreover,
the Court imposed stringent factual pleading requirements which appear to be wholly inconsistent
with the notice-pleading objective of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). It is not surprising that the Court has been accused of manipulating
the doctrine of standing to suit its own purposes. See Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1705-06 nn.31-
33.
159 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 507 & n.17; f. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972) (standing granted under civil rights act where plaintiff alleged injury as a result
of discriminatory housing practices).
160 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
161 Although the facts of Warth and Arlington Heights were extremely similar, the court
distinguished the two by holding that Arlington Heights involved a particular housing project, but
Warth did not. 429 U.S. at 264. This distinction is less than satisfactory, because at least one
contemplated project was involved in Warth. See 422 U.S. at 516-17. More fundamentally, it is
difficult to determine why such a factor should be dispositive of the standing issue, and the Court
has offered no explanation.
162 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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denied standing to an organization representing indigents who also pos-
sessed what, until that time, had appeared to be the type of injury suffi-
cient to confer standing:6 s deprivation of free medical care as a result
of an Internal Revenue Service ruling that permitted hospitals to retain
their preferential tax status even if they ceased providing free care to
indigents.1" As in Warth, the Court held the alleged injury insufficient
because it was not certain to be redressed by a favorable decision on the
merits.' 15 The striking feature of the Welfare Rights decision, however,
was its apparent holding that the alleged injury was inadequate in a
constitutional sense, thereby depriving the Court of article III jurisdic-
tion to hear the case. 6 Such a holding appears to contradict directly
the result in SCRAP-a case which presented even weaker evidence of
injury and redressability than did the Welfare Rights case but that was,
nevertheless, adjudicated on the merits.16 7
The Warth and Welfare Rights decisions might have been viewed
simply as evidence of a resurrection of restrictive Supreme Court no-
tions of injury, rather than an exercise in arbitrariness. Two years
after Welfare Rights, however, the court granted standing in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.""8 on the ba-
sis of a very attenuated claim of injury.' 9 There, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act,1 70 which limits
the liability of private companies for damages resulting from nuclear
power plant accidents,17 1 alleging that particular environmental and
aesthetic injuries would be redressed if the Act were invalidated, be-
cause construction of the subject plant would not be completed.17  Rec-
1I" See infra note 165.
104 426 US. at 28-36.
1" Id. at 40-46. The Welfare Rights case is difficult to distinguish from earlier cases such as
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), and Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), in
which rather general expressions of congressional intent to benefit a particular group were held to
be a sufficient basis for standing. The charitable-organization provision of the Internal Revenue
Code, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976), involved in Welfare Rights seems to evidence a genuine congres-
sional desire to induce private parties to aid indigents. If the incentive scheme proves to be of
limited effectiveness, that may provide a policy argument for new legislation. It does not, however,
provide a basis for denying beneficiaries of the scheme standing to claim whatever benefits might
exist. In this regard, the Welfare Rights decision poses serious separation-of-powers problems.
The separation-of-powers component of justiciability is discussed infra notes 205-57 and accompa-
nying text.
I See 426 U.S. at 45-46; see also id. at 64 (Brennan, J., concurring).
,,1 The Court attempted, with very little success, to distinguish SCRAP. See 426 U.S. at 45
n.25.
'" 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
, See id. at 102-03 (Stevens, J., concurring).
170 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
171 See 438 U.S. at 63-67.
172 See id. at 72-78. It may be that the Court in Duke Power strained to find standing in
order to reverse the decision of the lower court invalidating the Act, because the Supreme Court
believed that unless reversed on the merits, the lower-court decision would undesirably impede the
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ognition of the alleged injury as sufficient to confer standing would
have followed quite naturally from SCRAP, but because of the Court's
intervening standing decisions, the Duke Power decision simply ren-
dered unintelligible any description of the Supreme Court's concept of
injury.
In light of the mystifying contours of "injury" that emerge from
Supreme Court standing decisions, one doubts whether a viable concept
of injury any longer exists.178 When "injury" meant invasion of a le-
gally protected interest, the concept was intelligible; it simply resembled
the question of whether the plaintiff had a claim on the merits. 74 Al-
though the Supreme Court has now expanded the concept of "injury"
beyond "legal injury," it has stopped short of literal "injury in fact,"
without explaining where the stopping point is.17 5  For example, a
plaintiff claiming to be so upset by an allegedly unconstitutional gov-
ernment program that it caused the plaintiffs blood pressure to rise
development of nuclear power. Cf id. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring).
' Commentators have frequently noted the confusion that has plagued the Court's defini-
tions of sufficient injury to convey standing. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 1, at 1291 ("the Su-
preme Court is struggling manfully, but with questionable success, to establish a formula for
delimiting who may sue that stops short of 'anybody who might be significantly affected by the
situation he seeks to litigate.' "); Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1705 ("[t]he ease of manipulation [of
standing criteria] is especially enhanced because the doctrine is so amorphous and confused");
Wolff, supra note 154, at 678 ("[t]he confusing and inconsistent nature of these decisions has been
the subject of judicial and scholarly comment [citations omitted]"). The Court itself has recently
recognized the confusing trail it has left and admitted "[w]e need not mince words when we say
that the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the
various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it. . . ." Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
1. Analytically, the two concepts are identical. A "legal injury" exists when the legal provi-
sion that the plaintiff claims the defendant violated is intended to protect the interests of some
identifiable class, of which the plaintiff is a member, from some identifiable category of harms,
which includes the harm suffered by the plaintiff. See supra note 149. As noted infra text accom-
panying notes 228-35, this formulation also describes the nonconstitutional "nexus" and "zone of
interest" components of current standing doctrine. The formulation is problematic, because it has,
of course, been possible to establish standing under the "legal injury" standard and yet lose on the
merits. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). A plausible expla-
nation for this possibility is simply that courts made less-searching inquiries when addressing the
issue of standing than when addressing the merits. A favorable decision on the issue of standing
meant that the plaintiff might win, and a favorable decision on the merits meant that the plaintiff
would win. This distinction seems to be retained in the present formulation of the zone-of-interest
test that a plaintiff can satisfy merely by demonstrating that his or her interest is "arguably"
within the zone of interests protected by the provision of law sought to be enforced. See infra note
230; cf Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971) (because economic injury suf-
fered by plaintiffs was arguably within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect, plain-
tiffs had standing to sue).
175 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-54 (1970);
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939) (power com-
pany actually injured by TVA competition, but not entitled to redress without legal injury); Kan-
sas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 928-29 (D.C. Cir.) (possibility that power
company will be put out of business by municipal competition is injury without legal remedy),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); see also Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 450, 457 (1970) (discussing distinction between injury-in-fact and legal injury).
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would, in all likelihood, be held not to suffer a qualifying injury,"'6
even though a plaintiff alleging economic, competitive harm would suf-
fer such an injury.17 The Supreme Court, however, has offered no
explanation for why the two harms should be treated differently. Both
seem to be injuries "in fact." Moreover, the tangible or intangible na-
ture of the harm at issue seems to be irrelevant, 17 s as does its objective
or subjective nature. 17  The Court's criterion for identifying "injury"
appears at best to be intuitive, but even the Court's intuitions are diffi-
cult to understand.180
Any action-especially government action-affects a variety of
people with varying degrees of certainty and immediacy. For example,
if the government authorizes operation of a nuclear power plant but the
authorization is arguably unlawful because mandatory safety require-
ments were not adequately complied with, the resulting array of
threatened injuries is vast. Should there be a meltdown, 81 the employ-
'7 Subjective injuries are typically viewed as an insufficient basis for standing. See, e.g.,
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972) (subjective "chill" of first amendment rights resulting
from allegedly unconstitutional Army surveillance program not adequate to make case justiciable).
177 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
178 Compare the intangible injuries that conveyed standing in United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669 (1973) (injury to environmental quality sufficient to convey standing), and Flast v. Co-
hen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (injury to plaintiff caused by application of federal funds to purchase
parochial school textbooks sufficient to confer standing), with the tangible injuries that did not, in
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (favorable tax treatment of hospi-
tals refusing to serve indigents did not sufficiently injure plaintiffs to confer standing), and Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (zoning ordinance that effectively excludes low income residents
does not sufficiently injure plalntiffs to confer standing).
17 Despite contrary language in cases such as Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972)
(subjective "chill" of first amendment rights resulting from allegedly unconstitutional Army sur-
veillance program not adequate to make case justiciable), the subjective or objective nature of an
injury does not adequately distinguish between those cases in which standing has been upheld and
those in which it has been denied. The injuries to indigents in Welfare Rights and to racial
minorities in Warth were objective. Yet, the plaintiffs in those cases were denied standing, while
the generalized subjective apprehension of future environmental harm was a sufficient basis for
standing in SCRAP. Indeed, the very distinction between subjective and objective injuries is too
elusive to be viable. The only sensible basis for distinguishing between subjective and objective
injuries is to focus on the number of people involved, but the Supreme Court has not viewed this
factor as dispositive. Rather, to the extent that large numbers of people are involved, it makes
standing harder, rather than easier, to establish. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-17 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974).
so Curiously, it was possible to conclude that high blood pressure resulting from intense
opposition to a government program would not fall within the ill-defined concept of injury-in-fact.
This suggests that some visceral distinction may exist between qualifying and nonqualifying inju-
ries, even though such a distinction cannot be articulated satisfactorily. Alternatively, the conclu-
sion may simply be an artifact of the well-established principle that mere concern about a problem
is not a sufficient basis for standing. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-40 (1972).
... A "meltdown" is the term commonly applied to a loss-of-coolant accident in a nuclear
reactor. Because the process of nuclear fission, which is central to the operation of a reactor,
produces a great deal of heat, large amounts of water must constantly be supplied to the core of an
operating reactor in order to dissipate this heat. Failure to supply water as a coolant for even a
few minutes would result in rapid temperature increases approaching 2,700 degrees Fahrenheit in
the reactor core. Such temperatures would melt the nuclear fuel, thereby initiating an "irreversible
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ees on duty would suffer immediate physical injuries. Other employees
would suffer loss of their jobs because the plant could no longer oper-
ate. Neighboring residents would suffer physical injuries from escaping
radiation and economic injury in the form of property loss from the
meltdown itself. Customers of the utility company operating the plant
would suffer increased rates so that the utility could purchase substitute
power from other sources and begin to pay for the economic conse-
quences of the meltdown. Residents of communities hundreds of miles
away would be threatened with physical injuries as radiation was car-
ried by the winds to their conimunities, and all taxpayers would suffer
increased taxes to pay for the remedial actions that Congress would
have to take. Even unborn generations might be harmed by long-term
effects of radiation exposure that have yet to be discovered.18
Who should have standing to seek an injunction prohibiting opera-
tion of such a plant? It is no answer to say that "injured" parties are
authorized to sue. Virtually everyone in the United States is "injured,"
but it is unclear how far along the continuum of affected parties the
right to sue should extend.188
The Court's recent precedents offer no guidance, and no com-
monly shared concept of injury exists to facilitate line-drawing."
Moreover, confusion is heightened because the SCRAP decision indi-
cates that the case-or-controversy limitation of article III will tolerate
virtually any extension of standing. 8 5 Further, as the nuclear-
meltdown scenario indicates, the changing character of society may be
making injury an inherently undefinable concept on which to base jus-
chain of events," during which molten fuel and fission products could spread over the reactor floor
and breach the reactor's containment. Ultimately, this process could result in the release of high
levels of radiation into the atmosphere and into ground water. I. BUPP & J. DERIAN, LIGHT
WATER: HOW THE NUCLEAR DREAM DISSOLVED 122 (1978); B. COHEN, NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND
SOCIETY 126-27 (1974).
'" Fear of such consequences prompted environmentalists and residents of an area in which
a nuclear plant was being constructed to file suit in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), apparently hoping either to halt construction of the plant or to
increase their chances of being compensated for any injuries they might suffer as a result of the
plant's operation. See id. at 73.
18 Note that the attenuated injuries that threaten those at the far end of the continuum of
affected parties in the meltdown scenario are neither more remote nor less palpable than injuries
that the Supreme Court has already recognized as adequate to confer standing. See, e.g., United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (environmental aesthetic injury); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968) (taxpayer injury); c. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59 (1978) (environmental and aesthetic injury caused by thermal pollution of neighboring lakes).
184 It is probable that no analytically sound concept of injury ever existed-not even under
the now-abandoned "legal injury" standard. It may be that some consensus concerning cognizable
injury did exist under the "legal injury" standard, and consensus is an adequate foundation for a
viable rule of law. Now, however, it appears that even consensus is absent.
1" This view is further enhanced by Supreme Court recognition of justiciability in the so-
called "headless class action" cases which have no plaintiff at all. See infra note 191.
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ticiability rules.1 8
Without a viable concept of injury, there can be no meaningful
concept of "dispute." In addition, continued reliance on a concept of
injury that has no intuitive appeal as a justification for standing deci-
sions will eventually undermine the perceived legitimacy of judicial dis-
positions that is essential to effective adjudication."8 "
Adherence to the traditional model of adjudication has infected the
other justiciability doctrines as well. Like standing, the doctrine of ripe-
ness is rooted in the article III case-or-controversy provision, and re-
quires that the plaintiff's injury be suffered with a sufficient degree of
I" Cf Fiss, supra note I (increase in large, bureaucratic governmental structure requires a
new form of adjudication focusing on giving meaning to constitutional values).
87 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1705-06 nn.31-32.
The absence of consensus concerning the types of injuries that should be judicially cognizable
demonstrates the difficulty of determining where along the continuum of effects created by a chal-
lenged action the line should be drawn between effects that do and those that do not warrant
standing. One approach to resolving this problem is to conclude that no line should be drawn at
all, and that the entire range of effects produced by a challenged action should be judicially recog-
nized. Such an approach, which would constitute abolition of the injury-based standing require-
ment, has been adopted in certain circumstances. For example, Congress has enacted a number of
statutes containing "any person" provisions that permit enforcement by plaintiffs who would not
satisfy traditional standing requirements. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2619 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976); Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries (Ocean Dumping) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1976); Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1976); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911
(1976); cf. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976) ("any interested person"); id. §
2060(a) ("any consumer or consumer organization"); Federal Informers Act, 31 U.S.C. § 232
(1976) (any person may file suit on behalf of the United States and share in up to ten percent of
the recovery). As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that injury-based standing will be
abolished across-the-board.
An alternative to injury-based standing determinations would be for courts to base their deci-
sions on legislative intent. Standing would be granted to the intended beneficiaries of the provision
of law sought to be enforced, and would be denied to plaintiffs who were not within the contem-
plation of the drafters or whom the drafters wished to preclude from maintaining suit. Where
such a provision was a statutory one, intended beneficiaries could be identified through the normal
process of statutory construction. Moreover, a customary degree of inference concerning the draft-
ers' intent would be appropriate. Accordingly, even claims that might not have been directly ad-
dressed by the drafters of a provision could be inferred to fall within their contemplation. Where
the provision sought to be enforced was a constitut'onal one, the task of identifying beneficiaries
would be more difficult, but not substantively different. The court would have to ascertain the
intent of the framers-modified by the effects of social developments-just as it does in all cases of
constitutional interpretation.
This approach has, in fact, been used by the Court. It has ruled that standing will not be
granted unless the plaintiff can satisfy nexus requirements, which involve nothing more than es-
tablishing that the plaintiff's claimed interest is among the interests intended to be protected by the
drafters of the provision in question. See infra text accompanying notes 227-35. Such an approach
would not produce bright-line tests, because drafters do not always make clear who their intended
beneficiaries are. Indeed, the drafters in most cases may well have had no intent as to who should
be able to sue, because they may well have assumed that determination of who should have en-
forcement rights was a judicial function. Although this approach leaves the door open for result-
oriented manipulation of the drafters' intent by courts disposed to engage in such manipulation, it
would have the advantage of giving courts a familiar, principled ground for decision-the drafters'
intent-rather than leaving them to wrestle with the vacant concept of injury in fact.
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immediacy to warrant judicial intervention. 8 In the meltdown scena-
rio, the ripeness issue would be whether the probability that the plain-
tiff would be injured by a nuclear accident was great enough to make
the controversy a "live" one fit for judicial review. As with standing,
however, injuries that are quite remote and speculative have been held
sufficiently ripe to satisfy article III,l89 and the real question upon
which ripeness turns is where along the continuum of immediacy the
line authorizing maintenance of a suit should be drawn.
The doctrine of mootness, too, is rooted in article III. It requires
that a controversy be live, rather than resolved, in order to be justicia-
ble.190 Once the safety requirements are complied with in the meltdown
16 Ripeness stems from the Marbury-authorized protection of legal rights. In a case lacking
ripeness, premature intervention involves the court in the issuance of an advisory opinion, which
would exceed the article III case-or-controversy limitation on proper judicial activity. As a consti-
tutional matter, ripeness is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers. See United Pub. Work-
ers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (threat of environmental damage from operation of nuclear
power plants satisfies ripeness requirements); Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138
(1974) (suit ripe because Rail Act would operate inexorably to harm plaintiffs). Ripeness also
contains a nonconstitutional, prudential component authorizing dismissal of a case where delay
that would cause undue hardship to the parties might improve the context in which the court
adjudicates the case. See Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-56 (1967); see also
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 82 (delayed adjudication would frustrate policy objectives therefore
prudence requires immediate adjudication); Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 138
(delay would permit the court to avoid unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 3-13, at 60-62.
'8 In Duke Power the Supreme Court adjudicated the constitutional validity of an elaborate
statutory scheme for dealing with claims that might be asserted after a nuclear power plant acci-
dent, and did so before any such accident had occurred, even though the validity of the scheme
could depend upon the amounts and types of losses that resulted from the particular accident at
issue as well as upon whatever additional remedial actions Congress chose to take. See 438 U.S. at
81-82; cf id. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Supreme Court disregarded a
District of Columbia Circuit Court finding of lack of ripeness, and adjudicated the constitutional-
ity of the process for appointment of Federal Election Commission members before the Commis-
sion had exercised powers pertinent to the merits of the constitutional issue. See id. at 113-18.
In the Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, the Supreme Court adjudicated the merits of a claim
asserted by eight major railroads that a statutory reorganization scheme constituted an unconstitu-
tional taking of their property without just compensation prior to determination of the amount of
compensation that would be provided to the railroads. See 419 U.S. at 136-48.
In those cases, the Court apparently viewed the hardship of withholding immediate review as
outweighing the benefits that might result from waiting for an improved context for adjudication.
I" A case is "moot" when the plaintiff no longer suffers the injury complained of. Judicial
intervention under such circumstances would constitute the issuance of a prohibited advisory opin-
ion because the assistance of the court would no longer be needed to protect the plaintiff's legal
rights. As a result, adjudication of a moot case would exceed the article III case-or-controversy
limitation on federal jurisdiction much as resolution of a case that was not yet ripe would. See
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Powell v. McCormack, 395, U.S. 486, 496 n.7
(1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). The mootness doctrine is also grounded
in separation-of-powers concerns in that it seeks to confine courts to proper judicial activity. Ex-
ceptions to the mootness doctrine have been formulated to permit adjudication where collateral
consequences of the offensive conduct continue to exist despite termination of the primary injury,
see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968); where the defendant voluntarily ceases the
offensive conduct, but the voluntary cessation may not be permanent, see United States v. W.T.
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scenario, the preexisting controversy arguably would no longer exist
and, therefore, would be moot. As with standing and ripeness, however,
article III has been held to tolerate virtually any degree of mootness, '9
similarly rendering mootness determinations matters of drawing a line
along a continuum.
The justiciability doctrines aimed at avoidance of collusive suits
19 2
and finality"9 ' also stem from the injury orientation of the dispute-reso-
lution model, but as with standing, ripeness, and mootness, that model
does little to account for the doctrines' existence or to justify their oper-
ation. In addition, those doctrines are invoked too infrequently to have
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); and where, although terminated, the injury is "capable
of repetition yet evading review" because the normal duration of the injury is too short to permit
adjudication before it terminates, see Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-15
(1911). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 62-68.
"I Article III is strained to the limit by federal court adjudication of "headless class actions."
In such actions, there is no plaintiff at all presenting a live, ongoing controversy, because the case
has become moot with respect to the named plaintiff in a suit pleaded as a class action. In some
headless class actions the court's decision to adjudicate the merits stems from the fiction that the
certified class constitutes the plaintiff suffering the injury. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-
403 (1975). Others, involving classes that have not been certified, can be explained through appli-
cation of one of the traditional exceptions to the doctrine of mootness, see Deposit Guar. Nat'l
Bank v. Roper. 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (named plaintiff continued to suffer collateral consequences,
including inability to share in recovery of classwide litigation costs); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975) (injury to named plaintiff capable of repetition yet evading review). In United States
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980), the Supreme Court permitted an appeal of the
lower court's denial of a class certification motion made by a named plaintiff with respect to whom
the case had become moot and for whom none of the traditional exceptions applied. The Court
viewed the doctrine of mootness to be flexible with respect to "nontraditional" forms of litigation
such as the class action and viewed the plaintiff as analogous to a private attorney general. See id.
at 402-04. In headless class actions it may well be that some party suffers an injury sufficient to
warrant judicial intervention under the traditional, dispute-resolution model, but that party is not
before the court.
'" A suit is "collusive" when one of the parties, although nominally asserting a legal right,
has no genuine interest in the protection of that right, but merely participates in the suit for the
purpose of litigating the issues presented. For example, in United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302
(1943), the Supreme Court refused to adjudicate the merits of a tenant's treble-damage action
against his landlord for violation of the maximum rent level prescribed under the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, when it appeared that the landlord had instigated the suit
and hired the plaintiff's lawyer for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the Act. See id.
at 303-05. Because a collusive suit is motivated by a desire to obtain a declaration of law rather
than to resolve a genuine dispute, it is traditionally viewed as a request for an advisory opinion,
which exceeds the article III case-or-controversy jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-62 (1911). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 3-15, at 69-
71. Because the collusive-suit restriction is rooted in article III, the Court has held that not even
Congress can provide for judicial declarations of law in a "collusive" manner. See Muskrat, 219
U.S. at 349-51. But cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1976) (per curiam) (Supreme Court
decided constitutionality of Federal Election Campaign Act under expedited test-case procedures
prescribed in the Act, finding case or controversy to have been presented).
It can be difficult to distinguish between a nonjusticiable "collusive" test case and a permissi-
ble action for a declaratory judgment. Compare Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 360-62, with Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-44 (1937) (Aetna's plea to have insured's nonpayment of
premiums disqualify him from future benefits sufficiently live case or controversy). The distinc-
tion is likely to turn on how ripe the putative controversy is at the time that the suit is filed.
" See supra text accompanying notes 94-105.
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much practical significance.' Only the political question doctrine,
which is discussed below,195 has developed free from the constraints of
the injury requirement.
The inability of the dispute-resolution model to generate satisfac-
tory justiciability rules is particularly apparent in "public actions." A
public action is one filed primarily to vindicate an interest possessed by
the public in general, or a large segment thereof, rather than to redress
an "injury" suffered by the particular plaintiff who files suit.196
A suit filed to enjoin operation of a nuclear plant because of a
failure to satisfy mandatory safety requirements can be characterized as
a public action. Although one or more named plaintiffs technically
'" For example, the Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S.
371 (1980), refused to invoke the finality rule despite its seemingly obvious application to the case.
See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. Nor has the Supreme Court been willing to dis-
miss lawsuits as collusive, despite allegations of collusion, in such cases as Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 n.8, 280 n.14 (1978).
", See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
' The concept of public actions was described in relation to its historical antecedents by
Professor Jaffe. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1265 (1961). It has been characterized more recently by Professor Chayes, see Chayes, supra note
1, at 1302-03:
The public law litigation model portrayed in this paper reverses many of the
crucial characteristics and assumptions of the traditional concept of adjudication:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped prima-
rily by the court and parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and
amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and
legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form logi-
cally derived from the substantive liability and confined in its impact to the
immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flex-
ible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for
many persons including absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its ad-
ministration requires the continuing participation of the court.
(7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and statement of
governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for credible
fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litigation to ensure a just
and viable outcome.
(8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private indi-
viduals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public
policy.
In fact, one might say that, from the perspective of the traditional model, the pro-
ceeding is recognizable as a lawsuit only because it takes place in a courtroom
before an official called a judge. But that is surely too sensational in tone. All of the
procedural mechanisms outlined above were historically familiar in equity practice.
It is not surprising that they should be adopted and strengthened as the importance
of equity has grown in modern times.
See also supra note 53. The Supreme Court has generally been hostile toward adjudication of
public actions. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 131; see also HART & WECHSLER Supp., supra note
10, at 15; Stein & Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Trans-
national and Federal Context, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 219, 238-39 (1976).
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would have to maintain the suit in order to satisfy traditional standing
requirements, the suit would engage the active participation of the
government and a variety of special interest groups including the utility
operating the plant, labor unions, utility consumer groups, local civic
associations, and national environmental groups.' 98 In addition, the
public action would have a substantial 'impact on absentees, such as
residents of communities hundreds of miles downwind of the plant,
whose interests might well be given consideration by the court.1 99
Moreover, the remedy sought in the public action would probably be
injunctive in nature and could involve active supervision by the court
for extended periods of time.' °°
Realistically, the judiciary does not -become involved in public ac-
tions because such involvement is necessary to resolve a dispute between
the immediate parties. Contemporary judicial involvement in public ac-
tions constitutes active participation in the process of governance, and
appears to be here to stay.201 Because public actions are not private
disputes, they highlight the inadequacies of the justiciability rules de-
veloped to implement the dispute-resolution model.202 It is also in pub-
lic actions that unprincipled use of justiciability rules is most likely to
occur, thereby posing the greatest threat to perceived judicial legiti-
macy.-0 In the absence of a viable concept of injury, which is necessary
1'7 Although the Supreme Court has declined to adjudicate pure public actions, see supra
note 131, it has---consistent with the Marbury-based dispute-resolution model-adjudicated cases
dominated by public-action features. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). As long as the plaintiff alleges a right to redress of some cognizable
injury, judicial resolution of the broader issues involved theoretically can be viewed as a mere
incident to the court's ruling on the plaintiff's claim for relief.
I" See generally Chayes, supra note 1, at 1310-13 (discussing the representation of differing
interests in public litigation).
Other examples of public actions are school desegregation suits, employment discrimination
suits, electoral reapportionment actions, and large antitrust or securities fraud cases. Id. at 1284.
10, Id. As has been noted, Professor Brilmayer would view the adequacy of absentee repre-
sentation as a factor of sufficient importance to be of article III, constitutional dimensions. See
supra note 110. Professor Jaffe shares Brilmayer's concern with the interests of absentees, but he
would not give those interests constitutional stature. See Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV.
633, 634-35 (1971); c. Fiss, supra note 1, at 18-24 (the interests of affected groups, as opposed to
injured victims, should be the focus of a court's attention).
200 See generally Chayes, supra note 1, at 1298-1301. Professor Fis argues that management
of public actions and issuance of relief necessary to achieve desired structural reform of our social
institutions is a centerpiece of the judicial function. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 24-28, 44-58.
Although this Article recognizes the desirability of judicial involvement in public actions, it
views declaration-rather than implementation-as the essence of the judicial function. See supra
text accompanying notes 24-120.
201 Professor Fis has argued that, far from serving as the objects of judicial power, disputes
provide "occasions" for judicial construction of our social norms, and dispute-resolution is simply a
"mode of judicial operation" whereby the judiciary undertakes to give meaning to our public
values. Resolution of the dispute at issue is merely a "consequence" of this more important judi-
cial function. Fiss, supra note 1, at 29-30 (emphasis omitted).
202 See Chayes, supra note 1.
203 See Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1705-06 nn.31-33.
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to make the dispute-resolution model work, some other basis must be
found for making justiciability determinations.
B. Justiciability and the Expository Model
This Article suggests that exposition, rather than dispute resolu-
tion, is the truly important function served by courts. Accordingly, jus-
ticiability rules should be fashioned to facilitate proper exposition-or,
more accurately, to impede improper exposition. To facilitate exposi-
tion, justiciability doctrines must serve two objectives. First, they should
incorporate separation-of-powers concerns by minimizing the danger of
judicial usurpation of legislative functions-the one danger posed by
judicial action with which the framers seemed directly concerned.'"
Second, justiciability rules should be formulated to optimize the likeli-
hood that exposition will be well-informed and that the power to ex-
pound will be exercised prudently. Adherence to these objectives can
help assure that the judiciary is confined to proper judicial conduct.
1. Separation of Powers
The expository model of adjudication gives the judiciary an affirm-
ative, coequal function to serve in the operation of government, but it
does not authorize the judiciary to perform more than a coequal func-
tion. Because the value of exposition is prospective and somewhat pre-
scriptive in nature, there is a danger that the judiciary, under the guise
of expounding, can drift into the process of legislating. The gravity of
this danger is illustrated by the fact that such judicial impropriety may
well exceed the only meaningful limitation imposed upon the judiciary
by the framers-that of honoring the principle of separation of
powers.20 5
a. The Constitutional Concept of Justiciability
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that justiciability doc-
trines reflect concerns that are constitutional in stature.206 Conse-
quently, these concerns should find expression in the article III case-or-
controversy provision. 07 Analysis of that provision indicates that if the
204 See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
205 See infra notes 219-22.
20 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-45 (1976); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215-16 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
171-72 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-34 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
94-101 (1968).
207 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 206.
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framers intended it to have any particular meaning, they intended it to
preclude the judiciary from performing -legislative functions.
Proper examination of the case-or-controversy provision necessa-
rily begins with the intent of the framers in including it in the Consti-
tution. It is unlikely that the framers relied on any shared perception of
the structure or function of a federal judiciary. At the Constitutional
Convention, the proper function of the courts was hotly debated, dem-
onstrating significantly divergent desires and expectations among the
framers.2" 8 At one point, during the debate on whether the judicial
power should extend to cases arising urder the Constitution and laws
of the United States, the convention appears to have assumed that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts would be constructively limited to cases
of a "Judiciary Nature."20 9 The context of the debate, however, sug-
gests that the phrase "Judiciary Nature" was useful in resolving the
controversial dispute precisely because it was imprecise and permitted
each delegate to believe that it captured the thrust of his own position
on the issue. Moreover, the fact that proposals assigning what we now
consider to be nonjudicial functions to the courts210 were even consid-
ered by the Convention further suggests that the framers conceived of
courts as flexible entities whose roles were not precisely defined by
tradition.
This flexible view of American courts comports with the role his-
torically played by the English courts-the courts with which the fram-
ers were most familiar.2"' Since medieval times, English courts had en-
gaged in a variety of activities that were administrative rather than
judicial in nature.2" English courts not only resolved disputes, but they
18 See generally 1 & 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
(1911); 2 & 3 J. MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (H. Gilpin ed. 1841). The delegates
to the convention debated many aspects of the role of the federal judiciary. They debated whether
judges should be selected by Congress or by the President. See, e.g., I M. FARRAND, supra, at
119-21. They also debated the desirability of creating inferior courts, as opposed to relying on the
Supreme Court to hear appeals from state courts, in order to facilitate the avoidance of local
prejudice and promote uniformity in the development of the law. See, e.g., id. at 124-25, 232. In
addition, they debated the proper scope of federal jurisdiction and the desired degree of judicial
independence. See, e.g., id. at 232, 244; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 7-8.
209 See M. FARRAND, supra note 208, at 430.
210 See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
211 Justice Frankfurter has suggested that the historical role played by the English courts
must weigh heavily in determining what meaning should be ascribed to the "cases" and "contro-
versies" language of article III. See Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 443, 460 (1939) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Although historical precedent is an illuminating starting point for constitu-
tional analysis, it should not be viewed as dispositive where organic growth of the Constitution is
desired. Justice Frankfurter seems to have assumed that English practice coincided with what has
been advanced as the dispute-resolution model of adjudication. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150;
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460. As is discussed in the accompanying text, this appears not to have been
the case.
212 See 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 35, 128-29 (1938).
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also oversaw the operation ofprograms to assist the poor, issued and
revoked licenses, regulated wages and prices, and raised revenues to
support those administrative activities.213 Significantly, English courts
also issued advisory opinions at the request of Parliament.214 The judi-
ciary was viewed as an arm of the sovereign and its functions were
limited by little more than the sovereign's preferences.215
It is likely that the framers never reached any agreement about the
precise role that the new judiciary would play. The celebrated, ongoing
debate concerning the framers' intent with respect to judicial review of
the constitutionality of actions taken by other branches of govern-
ment2" indicates that the framers were capable of preserving a high
degree of ambiguity with respect to major issues. There is no reason to
suppose that the framers' intent concerning the proper role of the judi-
ciary was any more precise. The framers probably chose to leave unan-
swered questions about the courts' functions to the first Congress. Be-
cause Congress was to determine the size, structure and jurisdiction of
the federal judiciary, 17 it could also resolve competing policy considera-
213 See id. at 128-29; Berger, supra note 12, at 821; Jaffe, supra note 196, at 1269-70; Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 403-04 (1958).
21, See Veeder, Advisory Opinions of the Judges of England, 13 HARV. L. REV. 358, 359
(1900). Professor Berger has argued that the framers' apparent aversion to advisory opinions re-
sulted from the fear that issuance of such opinions concerning proposed legislation would bias
judges in a way that might render them less-effective guardians against an overreaching Congress.
This concern is quite different than the prevailing contemporary view that advisory opinions are
undesirable because their issuance poses the risk of judicial encroachment upon legislative powers.
See Berger, supra note 12, at 830-32; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968); 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 208, at 75-76.
2" As was stated by Blackstone:
[A]II courts of justice, which are the medium by which [the king] administers the
laws, are derived from the power of the crown .... [T]he king is supposed in
contemplation of law to be always present [in court]; but as that is in fact impossi-
ble, he is there represented by his judges, whose power is only an emanation of the
royal prerogative.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23-24 (footnotes omitted).
21' The endurance of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), has rendered the question of whether the framers intended to incorporate
judicial review into their constitutional scheme largely academic. Nevertheless, Marshall's opinion
remains controversial because the framers arguably never made any specific reference to judicial
review and because such a power never existed in England. There is evidence, however, that at
least some of the framers assumed that judicial review was a necessary constitutional protection.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (A. Hamilton). See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 6, at
15-25; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 9-11; Note, supra note 12, at 807-08. There is
surprisingly little to be found on the subject in the records of the convention. See generally M.
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 154 (1913); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10,
at 3. Many commentators support the power of judicial review. E.g., R. BERGER, CONGRESS V.
THE SUPREME COURT (1969); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 14-16; Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles, supra note 74, at 2-10. Others are more skeptical. E.g., L. HAND, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958). For an excellent short account of the constitutional debates over the
nature and functions of the judiciary, and the attendant ambiguities, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 10, at 1-23.
1'7 The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as well as the entire jurisdiction of
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tions relating to how active a role the new judiciary should play.21
The framers did, however, take a series of actions that proved sig-
nificant because they suggest that the Convention did have a well-devel-
oped preference for what is now commonly referred to as the separation
of powers-particularly with respect to Congress and the Courts. A
proposal to create a Council of Revision, -which would have permitted
federal judges to rule on the constitutionality of contemplated legisla-
tion before it took effect, was rejected by the Convention.219 In addition,
the Convention rejected a proposal to make the Chief Justice one of the
members of a contemplated Privy Council to advise the President on
legislative matters.220 Moreover, the Convention declined to authorize
the executive and legislative branches of government to require the Su-
preme Court to issue legal opinions. 21 Frequently cited reasons for re-
jection of these proposals relate to the desire to keep the judiciary out of
the legislative process.
222
b. Legislation v. Exposition
Proper regard for the separation of judicial and legislative func-
tions requires an appreciation of the distinction between exposition and
legislation. In one respect, the two appear to be quite similar. Both
have prospective and prescriptive impact. Legislation regulates future
conduct to make it conform to the legislature's view of public policy,
and exposition regulates future conduct to make it conform to the judi-
ciary's view of the dictates of statutory and constitutional provisions.
Despite the fact that both regulate future conduct, there is an important
difference between legislation and exposition-one that relates to the
inferior courts is, nominally at least, subject to the control of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ I
& 2; see also Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441 (1850). But see Hart, supra note 77. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 18-
27.
3,6 To date, Congress has taken no comprehensive action to regulate the context in which
judicial review properly should occur or the concomitant degree of activity that the federal judici-
ary should play in the governing process. Rather, Congress intervenes sporadically to regulate
judicial activity in particular substantive areas, to implement particular policy preferences. For
example, Congress has precluded judicial review of certain decisions of the Administrator of the
Veterans' Administration. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (Supp. 1111979). In addition, Congress has greatly
liberalized standing requirements under a variety of environmental statutes, presumably to further
congressional efforts to protect the environment. See supra note 213. Moreover, when Congress
desired rapid resolution of the constitutional problems raised by its campaign reform efforts, it
provided for expedited judicial review under a diluted, any-voter standing provision. See Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § 315(a) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a)
(Supp. IV 1980)).
'19 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 208, at 73-83, 298-302; 1 id. at 97-105, 138-40.
2O 2 id. at 328-29, 340-44, 367.
22 Id.
' See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 7-8.
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institutional constraints surrounding each activity.
Legislation consists of making policy-an activity that is virtually
unbounded. The only limitations on legislative power, aside from spe-
cific constitutional restrictions, are the legislators' views of expediency
and political realities. The reason such legislative freedom is palatable,
and even desirable, is that legislators are subject to relatively immediate
political accountability.223 If their policy determinations are unpopular,
they can be voted out of office, and new legislators can make new
policies.
Proper exposition does not involve policymaking. Because it has
been insulated purposely from immediate political accountability, the
judiciary does not possess the institutional competence to make policy; it
is not empowered to do what it believes to be expedient simply because
such an action appears to be a good idea. Rather the judiciary must
engage in textual analysis, honor the doctrine of stare decisis, and,
where constitutional exposition is involved, give proper regard to facili-
tation of orderly social evolution. By creating separate legislative and
judicial branches, the framers intended to prevent the judiciary from
engaging in policymaking.
c. Reducing the Risk of Judicial Policymaking
Separation-of-powers concerns suggest that justiciability rules
should be aimed at reducing the likelihood that courts will engage in
legislative, policymaking activities. Current justiciability rules, however,
actually encourage judicial policymaking in two ways. First, the con-
cept of injury, the bulwark against judicial legislation under the tradi-
tional model, does not adequately serve its purpose, thereby compelling
courts to make policy in order to determine whether an injury exists.
Second, raising the bulwark of injury to a constitutional status while
relegating the current nexus requirement to a mere "prudential" status
encourages the judiciary to intrude on policy choices that properly be-
long to the legislature. If any aspect of a justiciability inquiry is to be
given constitutional status, it should be the nexus requirement because
of its close relation to separation-of-powers concerns. The determina-
tion of when a statutory provision should be enforced-the nexus deter-
"3 Indeed, the United States Constitution was developed from a theoretical and historical
context that specifically contemplated representative participation in policymaking. See THE FED-
ERALIST 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) ("f[in republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates"); B. BAILYN, THFE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU.
TION 161-75 (1967) (prior to the American Revolution the right to actual representation in poli-
cymaking came to be seen as natural right). See generally C. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS (outlining theory of separation of powers and legislative supremacy).
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mination-is legislative in nature and should not be left to the discre-
tion of the judiciary. Rather, justiciability rules based upon the
expository model should simply focus on the nature of the issues before
the court and the court's institutional competence to resolve them.
The traditional belief has been that courts will not trespass upon
the legislative function as long as they confine themselves to redressing
particularized injuries.224 If the injury presented to the court for redress
is no different from the kind of injury suffered by the public at large,
then the plaintiff would be asserting a mere "generalized grievance[ ]
about the conduct of government,"22 which properly should be resolved
by one of the political branches rather than by the judiciary.2 Injury-
114 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
U5 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
"' In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has found that lack of particularized injury ren-
dered nonjusticiable the dispute at issue, even though it has made very little sense to speak in
terms of injury. In each of those cases, the plaintiff sought to enjoin alleged governmental violation
of a constitutional provision that was intended to benefit the public at large and was not, therefore,
likely to be violated in a way that would produce particularized injury. Accordingly, the Court's
refusal to reach the merits in those cases effectively precluded judicial review of the government's
actions without any convincing explanation of why such preclusion of review was warranted. For
example, in Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), the Supreme Court refused to reach the merits
of a challenge to the appointment of Justice Black as a justice of the Supreme Court. It was
argued that, because Justice Black had voted to increase the retirement benefits of Supreme Court
justices while serving as a member of the United States Senate, he could not sit on the Court
without violating the ineligibility clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 6, cl. 2, which prohibits
members of either House of Congress from holding any civil office that was created, or the emolu-
ments of which were increased, while that member served in the legislature. The apparent intent
of the provision was to prevent potential conflicts of interest. The Supreme Court refused to reach
the merits because the challenge, filed by someone claiming only to be a citizen and member of the
Bar of the Supreme Court, did not allege any particularized injury resulting from Justice Black's
appointment. Levitt, 302 U.S. at 634.
In United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), the Supreme Court refused to reach the
merits of a challenge to the manner in which the Central Intelligence Agency was funded. The
plaintiff argued that, by refusing to disclose the amount of the Agency's annual budget, Congress
violated article I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution, which requires "a regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money." Presumably, that provision was intended
to promote public accountability for the expenditure of public funds. The Supreme Court found
that the taxpayer plaintiff suffered no particularized injury sufficient to establish standing.
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), decided the same
day as Richardson, the Supreme Court refused to reach the merits of a challenge to the simultane-
ous membership of some legislators in both Congress and the armed forces reserves. The plaintiffs
argued that such dual membership violated the incompatibility clause of the Constitution, art. I, §
6, cl. 2, which prohibits persons holding "any Office under the United States" from serving in
Congress while holding that office. As in Ex parte Levitt, the apparent intent of the provision was
to prevent potential conflicts of interest. The Supreme Court denied standing to the citizen and
taxpayer plaintiffs, again because they failed to establish a cognizable, particularized injury.
Most recently, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), the Supreme Court refused to reach the merits of a
challenge to a government "gift" of a 77-acre tract of land to a religious school. The plaintiff
challenged the "gift" as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment, which states
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The establishment
clause presumably was intended to prevent the problems that can result from failure to honor the
separation of church and state. As in the other cases, the Supreme Court denied standing to the
citizen and taxpayer plaintiffs because they failed to establish the requisite degree of particularized
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based limitations, however, are no longer viable constraints on judicial
action because no consensus exists as to the definition of a cognizable
injury.
In some respects, the Supreme Court's injury-oriented approach to
justiciability has been not only unsatisfying but counterproductive. In
addition to an article III "injury" requirement, standing doctrine also
encompasses nonconstitutional, "prudential" limitations.127 The most
well-known of the prudential limitations requires that a "nexus" be
established between the plaintiff's injury and the provision of law that
the plaintiff seeks to enforce.228 The nexus concept can best be under-
stood as a requirement that courts respect the intent of the drafters of
the provision claimed to have been violated. If the drafters intended
that provision to protect or benefit the interest asserted by the plaintiff
in connection with the alleged harm, the requisite nexus exists.2
For example, in suits filed under the federal Administrative Proced-
ure Act2 5-the context out of which many standing decisions
injury. Cf Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 486-88 (1974).
"7 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 n.18 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
"Prudential" requirements are not compelled by article III, but rather have been evolved by the
judiciary as complementary rules of self-restraint. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255
(1953). Because of the lack of article III compulsion, Congress can override "prudential" rules.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972). Common "prudential" requirements
include the "nexus" requirement, discussed infra text accompanying notes 228-35, and the restric-
tion on a plaintiff's ability to raise the rights of parties not before the court. See Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-81 (1978). Curiously, the prohibition on
judicial redress of generalized grievances, see supra note 131 and accompanying text, is also
viewed as a "prudential" limitation, see Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80, despite its arguably intimate
connection to the separation-of-powers function of justiciability doctrines. See supra note 10; notes
130-31 and accompanying text.
228 The "nexus" requirement appears to have originated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102
(1968). See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78 (1978).
2" See Jaffe, supra note 199, at 634-35. In Flast, the Supreme Court held that for a federal
taxpayer to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal spending program he or
she must challenge an exercise of congressional power under the article I, § 8 taxing and spending
power, as opposed to challenging an expenditure that is merely incidental to an essentially regula-
tory scheme, and must allege that the challenged action violates a specific constitutional limitation
imposed on congressional taxing and spending, as opposed to merely alleging that the challenged
action generally exceeded Congress's legislative powers. 392 U.S. at 102-03. The test was instantly
challenged as having no bearing on the justiciability concerns that underlie the doctrine of stand-
ing. See id. at 121-30 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
If the test has any vestige of rationality it is as a flawed attempt to prohibit a danger about
which the framers felt very strongly. If the framers are viewed as having had a special desire to
protect taxpayers from government diversion of their taxes for religious purposes, it is not unrea-
sonable to "deem" taxpayers to have a sufficient nexus to the first amendments establishment
clause to be granted standing. See id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 504-05
(1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
s 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559; 701-706 (1976). Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), grants standing to "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute." That provision has been construed to impose two requirements on a plaintiff seeking to
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arise23 1-the nexus requirement demands that the plaintiff's interest be
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question. A plaintiff asserting en-
vironmental interests will satisfy the nexus, or zone-of-interests, re-
quirement in a suit to compel preparation of an environmental impact
statement,232 but a plaintiff seeking to avoid an FTC divestiture order
will not, because avoidance of divestiture is not one of the interests that
the drafters of legislation requiring the preparation of environmental
impact statements intended to protect.2"'
Early Supreme Court nexus decisions appear to have treated the
requirement as part of the article III case-or-controversy limitation on
federal jurisdiction.'" Curiously, however, the Supreme Court has sub-
establish standing under the Act. First the plaintiff must allege some "injury in fact" caused or
threatened by the challenged conduct-an article III requirement. Second, the plaintiff must estab-
lish that the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests protected by the
provision of law sought to be enforced-a nonconstitutional "nexus" requirement. See Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-56 (1970); see also Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970).
The injury-in-fact requirement has traditionally been treated more seriously than the zone-
of-interests test. In Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), the Supreme Court, rely-
ing on Data Processing, did little more than assume that the plaintiff's interest in freedom from
competition was arguably within the zone of interests of the pertinent statute, stating that the
question of whether it was actually within the zone of interests was to be resolved on the merits.
Id. at 620-21. Cursory treatment of the zone-of-interests test in Data Processing itself and in its
progeny prompted some commentators to view the test as inconsequential. See, e.g., Albert, supra
note 226, at 496; Seder, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND.
L. REV. 479, 487 (1972); Comment, Standing to Sue in Federal Courts: The Elimination of
Preliminary Threshold Standing Inquiries, 51 TUL. L. REV. 119, 122-23 (1976). The require-
ment has not disappeared, however. See, e.g., Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
231 A LEXIS search of recent court of appeals cases revealed that over 250 decisions involv-
ing standing and the Administrative Procedure Act were handed down between January 1977 and
January 1983.
2" See, e.g., Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2S See, e.g., Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 1975); df. Realty
Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (allegation of economic injury alone
insufficient to bring injury within NEPA's zone of interests).
2 See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). In that case, the mother of an
illegitimate child filed a class action to enjoin discriminatory application of a Texas parental-
support statute. The plaintiff alleged that the statute, which made it a misdemeanor for a parent
wilfully to refuse to provide for the support of his or her child, was being applied to prosecute
only the parents of legitimate children, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Consti-
tution. Presumably, the plaintiff's goal was to create an incentive for the father of her child to
provide support payments. The court held that she lacked standing because enforcement of the
statute would result in the incarceration of the father of her child, and not in receipt of support
payments. Id. at 618-19. Such a holding today would be based upon the lack of an injury likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits-a defect that goes to the nominal article III
component of standing. See supra note 130. Although lack of redressibility is precisely the prob-
lem that troubled the court in Linda R. S., it termed the problem a "nexus" defect, reasoning that
where the requisite nexus had not been established, the injury was not caused by the asserted
violation of law. See 410 U.S. at 617-18. In addition, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), can be
read as having treated "nexus" as an article III requirement, id. at 97-102. Although the Flast
Court recognized that there was some confusion concerning whether restrictions on taxpayer
standing were constitutionally grounded, id. at 97, it failed to clarify matters with respect to the
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sequently held that nexus requirements are nonconstitutiona1235 -even
though nexus requirements appear to be more closely related to the
framers' separation-of-powers concerns than does the concept of injury,
which presently is treated as constitutional. The Court appears to have
drawn its distinctions between constitutional and nonconstitutional
standing requirements in a way that is precisely backwards, because it
actually encourages judicial usurpation of legislative policymaking
functions.
Nexus inquiries promote separation of powers by preventing the
judiciary from overriding legislative policy choices. As a practical mat-
ter, most justiciability determinations turn on policy issues relating to
the desirability of entertaining particular suits at particular points in
time. These are policy issues that properly should be resolved by the
legislature rather than the courts, and the judiciary should defer to
those legislative resolutions. Legislative policy determinations of this
type are embodied, at least tacitly, in the intent of the drafters in enact-
ing the provision of law sought to be enforced-the subject of the nexus
inquiry.2"'
The policymaking nature of justiciability decisions is manifest in
the broad societal interests that bear on such determinations. Judicial
protection of an interest entails social costs, not only through expendi-
tures of public funds, but also through inconvenience and cost to the
defendant. Justiciability rules can serve the function of distinguishing
between suits in which the inconvenience and expense of litigation war-
rant expenditure of societal resources to protect the plaintiffs interest,
and suits in which the inconvenience and expense do not. Arguably,
maintenance of a suit is less likely to be desirable as the effect on the
plaintiff's interest becomes less direct, 2"7 but a court must draw the
line between justifiable and unjustifiable expenditure of resources
where the legislature tells it to. The separation of powers prohibits
judicial policymaking in court rulings on justiciability.
Further, the point along the continuum of affected interests at
which justiciability lines are drawn has an immediate impact on the
degree to which privately induced enforcement of laws is encouraged.
To the extent that justiciability lines are drawn with the conscious in-
tent of regulating the degree of ensuing law enforcement, the line draw-
"nexus" test that it announced. Id. at 102. The language suggests that an article III jurisdictional
standard was established, but such a reading of the case is unsatisfying, precisely because the test
has so little to do with justiciability concerns. See supra note 229.
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978).
See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text; d. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing,
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41.
"7 Cf. Scott, supra note 156, at 675-83.
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ing again serves a specific policy function. For example, Congress has
enacted a variety of laws containing provisions that authorize the main-
tenance of suits to enforce particular statutory provisions by private
parties who appear not to suffer any injury in the traditional sense.2" 8
These "citizen-suit" provisions seem to have been motivated by a desire
to increase law enforcement through private litigation 239-a policy de-
termination that should not be judicially supplanted.
The timing of judicial exposition, which is directly governed by
justiciability rules, can also raise policy considerations. For example,
judicial review of the adequacy of a utility's compliance with safety
requirements for a nuclear power plant can have different consequences
depending upon its timing. If early review is permitted, at the proposal
or blueprint stage, authorization for construction can be seriously
delayed, thereby increasing construction costs in an inflationary econ-
omy and precluding prompt availability of needed energy sources. If
review is delayed until an operating license is sought, however, safety
defects serious enough to prohibit operation of the plant or to require
major remedial measures could produce staggering financial losses to
the utility and its ratepayers which might have been avoided by earlier
judicial intervention. Realistically, the timing of review is also likely to
affect the degree of vigor with which courts will require adherence to
safety standards. Balancing such competing considerations requires
policymaking expertise, not judicial skills.2 40
When a court makes a nexus determination, that determination
embodies legislative resolution of the policy issues inherent in a legisla-
tive decision to authorize or preclude litigation. Because proper respect
for separation of powers requires courts to defer to such legislative deci-
sions, courts cannot properly ignore the results of their nexus inquiries.
Nevertheless, under current standing law, the judiciary has given itself
the option of ignoring at least tacit, and possibly even explicit, expres-
sions of legislative intent concerning the desirability of judicial interven-
tion. 41 The nexus requirement has been denominated a "prudential"
" See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 187.
239 The Supreme Court has, on occasion, found that Congress desired to grant standing to
the extent permissible under article III in order to maximize private enforcement actions. For
example, in Traflcante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) and Gladstone Real-
tors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), the Court interpreted various provisions of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976), as evidencing congressional intent to
grant such standing in order to help implement the congressional policy of reducing racial discrim-
ination in housing. See 409 U.S. at 208-12; 441 U.S. at 100-09.
240 See supra text accompanying notes 27-60.
24, Presumably, courts would defer to a congressional grant of standing as long as Congress
did not seek to push the courts beyond the limits of article III. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972) ("where a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the
litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue,' [citation omitted] is one
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rule of "judicial self-restraint," and only "injury in fact" is deemed to
be constitutionally required. 42
There is a striking paradox in this formulation of the law. It is
possible for Congress to grant standing to plaintiffs who suffer no
traditional injury in order to maximize enforcement, but for a court
then to invalidate the statutory grant of standing on jurisdictional
grounds, due to lack of an article III injury. 4 ' If a court should issue
such a decision, however, it would improperly be exercising legislative,
policymaking power; it would, paradoxically, be usurping power for
the purpose of denying itself power. In sum, the traditional model's
reliance on "injury in fact" as a constitutional minimum and nexus
determinations as a prudential restraint is seriously defective because it
does not advance separation-of-powers objectives.
Adoption of the expository model suggests two significant depar-
tures from the traditional model that would better implement separa-
tion-of-powers concerns. First, courts should focus on the nature of the
issue presented to the court rather than on whether the plaintiff asserts
a cognizable injury. If the issue is one that is legislative in nature,
where the will of the majority should control, proper regard for separa-
tion of powers requires the court to be parsimonious in its exercise of
judicial review, deferring to whatever expressions of congressional in-
tent are available. Where, however, the nature of the issue presented to
the court is such that its resolution calls for a degreeof insulation from
within the power of Congress to determine."); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) ("Congress can, of course, resolve the question [of standing] one
way or another, save as the requirements of Article III dictate otherwise [citation omitted]."). It is
possible, however, to view the important issues raised by justiciability doctrines as so inherently
judicial that Congress could not compel the courts to adjudicate even an article III case or contro-
versy if the courts deemed adjudication under the circumstances to be sufficiently ill-advised.
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1973), the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to resolve certain environmental issues arising under a provi-
sion of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970). The statute con-
tained a "citizen-suit" provision authorizing maintenance of actions to enforce the provisions of the
statute by "any person." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). Without referring to that provision, the
court dismissed the action for lack of standing, stating its belief that the plaintiffs had failed to
allege any article III injury and had alleged nothing that brought them within the zone of interests
protected by the Act. 481 F.2d at 121. The court went on to hold that even if its injury analysis
was wrong a dismissal for lack of standing was still warranted, because the statute "is ineffective
to deny the exercise of judicial restraint in determination of standing in cases like these, and we
choose to exercise that restraint." Id.
The decision was almost certainly wrong. It ignored an unambiguous policy determination
made by Congress without invalidating the pertinent congressional enactment. It does not follow,
however, that, within the sphere of article III cases and controversies, Congress necessarily has the
last word on justiciability. If the reason for declining to exercise congressionally compelled juris-
diction was adequate, the doctrine of separation of powers itself would authorize the court to
dismiss the action. See infra text accompanying notes 258-310.
24" See supra note 227.
'" This is arguably what the court did in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 481
F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1973). See supra note 241.
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majority desires, the court should exercise the full extent of its judicial
power as the guardian of our fundamental values. It is true, of course,
that classification of the issue before the court will often be difficult, but
focusing on the nature of an issue will at least make the court address
the proper question rather than addressing an extraneous one about
injury. Second, to the extent that it is proper to view justiciability re-
quirements as constitutional in nature, the nexus determination should
be raised to the constitutional stature separation-of-powers principles
demand.
There is another respect in which the Supreme Court's injury ori-
entation has frustrated separation-of-powers concerns. As noted above,
the framers appear to have invited Congress to play a more active role
than it has played in shaping the nature of the judicial function.
244
Whatever the reason for the reluctance of early Congresses to accept
this invitation, in recent times the Supreme Court itself may have con-
tributed to congressional timidity through its frequent insistence that
not even Congress can authorize federal courts to entertain suits in the
absence of an article III "injury in fact." Besides being almost certainly
wrong,2 5 the Court's frequent pronouncements of the need for an arti-
cle III injury246 may well have had an in terrorem effect on Congress,
chilling it from taking actions in the area of justiciability that it other-
wise would have taken as a policy matter.2 47 If that is the case, the
244 See supra note 217.
145 As has been discussed supra, text accompanying notes 130-203, the Supreme Court has
found many cases to have been justiciable where no traditional injury existed. Other commentators
have made similar observations. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 12, at 817-18 (neither English prac-
tice nor the policies embedded in article III require injury for the establishment of justiciability);
Jaffe, supra note 199, at 633, 634-35; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions,
75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 302-03 (1961) (the case-or-controversy provision of the Constitution does
not preclude adjudication of public actions); Tushnet, supra note 128, at 665 (Supreme Court has
transformed the law of standing from a constitutional to a statutory requirement).
2 0 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 130.
M7 For example, in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976),
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, stated:
Of course, the most disturbing aspect of today's opinion is the Court's insis-
tence on resting its decision regarding standing squarely on the irreducible Art. III
minimum of injury in fact, thereby effectively placing its holding beyond congres-
sional power to rectify. Thus, any time Congress chooses to legislate in favor of
certain interests by setting up a scheme of incentives for third parties, judicial re-
view of administrative action that allegedly frustrates the congressionally intended
objective will be denied, because any complainant will be required to make an al-
most impossible showing. Clearly the Legislative Branch of the Government cannot
supply injured individuals with the means to make the factual showing in a specific
context that the Court today requires. More specific indications of a congressional
desire to confer standing upon such individuals would be germane, not to the Art.
III injury-in-fact requirement, but only the Court's "zone of interests" test for
standing, that branch of standing lore which the Court assiduously avoids reaching.
The level of discontent with many Supreme Court justiciability decisions has been sufficiently
high that, in recent years, Congress has frequently held hearings on various proposals to modify
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court has done a disservice to the law of justiciability by suppressing
congressional involvement in its development, thereby offending the
principle of separation of powers. 48
justiciability doctrines and even to overrule specific Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., The Citi-
zen's Right to Standing in Federal Courts Act: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 680, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); The Citizen's Right to Standing in Federal
Courts Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders
Rights and Remedies of the Joint Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Administrative Procedure Act Amendments
of 1976: Hearings on S.S. 796-800, 1210, 1284, 2407-08, 2715, 2792, 3123, 3296-97 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Substantial portions of those hearings have been devoted to the article III
limits on congressional power to enact justiciability legislation even though careful analysis sug-
gests that such limits are virtually nonexistent. See supra note 287. Therefore one way Congress
might be prompted to play a more active role in the development of justiciability policy is for
commentators and the Supreme Court to advise Congress of the desirability of playing such a role
and of the virtually limitless power that Congress possesses to modify justiciability rules.
Some Supreme Court decisions have suggested that the article III injury requirement applies
only when Congress has not authorized an action, see, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 617 (1973), but current law requires the presence of a "distinct and palpable injury" in all
cases, even when Congress has authorized suit. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978). The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a fair amount of
latitude in congressional power to create a right, the deprivation of which would constitute an
injury sufficient for article III purposes. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1968); see also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring). It is unclear whether such congressional creation of justiciable rights would have to
be done piecemeal in substantive legislation, could be done on a broader basis in a statute such as
the Administrative Procedure Act, or could be done on an across-the-board basis by simple con-
gressional declaration of a desire to do so. Another view is that Congress could utilize the "private
attorney general" theory to circumvent any article III limitation on its power that otherwise might
exist, by designating a private party to assert the public interest in enforcement of the law. See
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Injury to the public would then
be viewed as satisfying the article III case-or-controversy requirement. See Associated Indus. of
N.Y. State Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). It is also unclear whether a plaintiff
must possess an independently cognizable injury in order to qualify for private-attorney-general
status.
'8 If Congress chooses not to exercise its policymaking function with respect to justiciability
doctrines, the Court will, of necessity, have to continue to make justiciability policy. Arguably,
congressional failure to enact justiciability legislation has ratified the Supreme Court's policy pref-
erences and, therefore, effectively discharged its legislative obligations. Assuming that tacit ratifica-
tion properly can be inferred from congressional inaction, two problems still remain. First, no such
inference would be warranted unless it were established that Congress had an accurate apprecia-
tion of the scope of its authority to set justiciability parameters. Otherwise congressional inaction
might well signify nothing more than congressional misunderstanding of the limits of legislative
power. Second, congressional deference to Supreme Court justiciability rules could be viewed as an
improper delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary. Although the nondelegation doctrine
generally is considered in the context of executive actions, see, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), the pertinent
separation-of-powers concerns are fully applicable with respect to judicial actions. Moreover,
congressionally enacted governing standards, which-nominally, at least-are required in order to
save the validity of legislative delegations to executive agencies, see Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at
530; Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 421, are almost completely absent in the realm of justiciability
where the judiciary alone has developed the governing law.
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d. The Political Question Doctrine
Of the available justiciability doctrines the political qfiestion doc-
trine seems best suited to protect the virtue of separation of powers. In
fact, ensuring the proper separation of powers has been specifically
cited as the doctrine's purpose.2 9 The political question doctrine has
developed with less attachment to the concept of injury than have the
other justiciability doctrines.250 Moreover, that doctrine focuses directly
on the nature of the question presented to the court, rather than on the
manner of its presentation. 51 Accordingly, the political question doc-
trine is an appropriate vehicle for separation-of-powers analysis pre-
cisely because the issue of whether a question constitutes a political
question mirrors the issue of whether the judiciary is institutionally
competent to resolve it.
A political question is one that the text of the Constitution com-
mits to another branch of government or for which no judicially man-
ageable standards governing proper resolution exist.2 52 As formulated,
the political question doctrine appears ideal for preserving the separa-
tion of powers; as applied, however, the doctrine is rarely invoked to
24 In the seminal political question case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme
Court stated:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a politi-
cal question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
Id. at 217.
Justice Powell reformulated the doctrine in a less awkward fashion in his concurring opinion
in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.):
As set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates
three inquiries: (i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the
text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolu-
tion of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?
(iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?
Id. at 998.
" But see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (in rejecting a taxpayer
standing claim, the Court asserted that because of the potential absence of any plaintiff able to
assert a traditional injury arising from the alleged violation of a constitutional provision, enforce-
ment of such a provision was better left to the political branches of government).
21 See supra note 249.
2i See supra note 249.
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preclude adjudication. 58 There is some evidence that the doctrine is on
the verge of a revival, but it is unclear whether the courts will apply
the revived doctrine meaningfully. In Goldwater v. Carter,2 54 a four-
justice plurality of the Supreme Court wished to rely on the political
question doctrine to avoid ruling on the validity of President Carter's
unilateral termination of a mutual defense treaty between the United
States and Taiwan-a necessary condition to diplomatic recognition of
the People's Republic of China. 55 Justice Powell, however, convinc-
ingly demonstrated that use of the political question doctrine would be
inconsistent with precedent, and voted to dismiss the case on ripeness
grounds.25  The position of the plurality in Goldwater v. Carter illus-
trates the possibility that the political question doctrine may be used to
preclude adjudication of cases that are politically charged rather than
cases threatening to abrogate separation of powers.25 7 Nevertheless, of
the present array of justiciability doctrines, the political question doc-
trine still seems best-suited to implement separation-of-powers objec-
"" See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 3-16, at 71-79. The cases described by Professor
Tribe contain varying formulations of the political question doctrine, but no particular formula-
tion seems satisfactory. Professor Henkin has argued that, in fact, no political question doctrine is
necessary, because other principles of law adequately advance the legitimate objectives of the polit-
ical question doctrine:
The "political question" doctrine, I conclude, is an unnecessary, deceptive
packaging of several established doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts to find
in it things that were never put there and make it far more than the sum of its
parts. Its authentic contents have general jurisprudential validity, and nothing but
confusion is gained by giving them special handling in selected cases. I see its
proper content as consisting of the following propositions:
1. The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political branches within
their constitutional authority.
2. The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the powers of the
political branches where the Constitution does not prescribe any.
3. Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply rights and standing
to object in favor of private parties.
4. The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of equity.
5. In principle, finally, there might be constitutional provisions which can
properly be interpreted as wholly or in part "self-monitoring" and not the subject of
judicial review. (But the only one the courts have found is the "guarantee clause" as
applied to challenges to state action, and even that interpretation was not
inevitable.)
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622-23 (1976) (footnote
omitted).
Properly understood, the political question doctrine is superfluous. It merely reflects separa-
tion-of-powers concerns that are best pursued through an understanding of the relative institu-
tional competence of each branch of government. To the extent that the formulations and tests
surrounding the political question doctrine impede such understanding-or provide an excuse for
dispensing with efforts to understand separation-of-powers principles-they are counterproductive.
See infra Conclusion.
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
255 Id. at 1002-06.
2" Id. at 997-1002.
"I Cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696-97 (1974).
EXPOSITORY JUSTICE
tives. Its very existence serves as a reminder that conscious efforts
should be made to prevent judicial usurpation of legislative power, and
a judiciary sensitive to the distinction between exposition and legislation
will be able to apply justiciability rules in a way that will advance this
objective.
2. Quality Control
In addition to facilitating maintenance of the separation between
legislative and judicial power, justiciability rules can enhance the quali-
ty of judicial exposition. The constitutional scheme can be viewed as
granting to each branch of government the power to do what is neces-
sary to perform its function properly. Congress is explicitly granted
such power by the "necessary and proper" clause of article I,258 and the
President is arguably granted such power implicitly in the article II
admonition that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed."2 59 Although article III contains no language granting
an analogous power to the judiciary, it is reasonable to suppose that the
judiciary, too, possesses the inherent power to avoid improper exercises
of its jurisdiction.200 In fact, it has been asserted that Marbury v.
Madison61 itself might have been better decided if it had limited its
holding to recognition of an inherent judicial power to avoid improper
exercise of its jurisdiction, rather than finding the more expansive
power of judicial review.
62
An inherent judicial power to decline improper exercises of juris-
diction has certain implications for the law of justiciability. Courts
need help to adjudicate properly. They need a proper context in which
to consider the principles they are called upon to expound, and they
" U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, c. 18 provides:
The Congress shall have Power. . .To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or officer thereof.
See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("the sound construction of
the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to per-
form the high duties assigned to it .... ")
"" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Presumably, there is inherent in this obligation some degree of
authority to comply with it.
200 Article III extension of the "judicial Power" to "cases" and "controversies," see supra
note 83, can be viewed as an obligation to adjudicate "cases" and "controversies" within the
court's jurisdiction. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 403 (1821). Presumably the
courts have the concomitant authority to do the job properly. Cf Crowell v. Benson, 285 US. 22,
56-65 (1932); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1872).
"' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
"2 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 34-38; see also G. GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 26-
27; J. NOWAK, supra note 6, at 9.
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need assistance in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of pertinent
arguments. Satisfaction of these needs reduces the likelihood of errone-
ous adjudication-adjudication in which the court would not have ex-
pounded on a principle of law as it did if the court had been apprised
of additional facts or arguments. Courts also need a mechanism for
avoiding imprudent exposition-exposition that miscalculates the advis-
ability of giving a principle a particular meaning at a particular point
in time. The justiciability rules that have emerged from the traditional
model recognize these needs to some extent but only satisfy them tan-
gentially.2 63 Similar rules, however, applied under the expository model
could respond directly to context, adversariness, and necessity concerns
to assure that the judiciary only exercises its power when it is appro-
priate to do so.
a. Context Restrictions
Context considerations facilitate adjudication because it is easier,
and safer, to expound a principle in a particular factual context than in
the abstract. For example, it is a manageable task to determine whether
the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution requires school de-
segregation in the context of a particular school system when a court
can determine the degree of segregation, ascertain the causes, and assess
the effectiveness of available remedies. It is not a manageable task to
determine in the abstract whether equal protection requires desegrega-
tion without knowing those facts.
At any given time, prior judicial exposition of a principle will have
made some facts clearly relevant to current exposition; proper adjudica-
tion would therefore be impossible in the absence of those facts. In a
school desegregation suit, under present law, the de jure or de facto
nature of the existing segregation is such a fact.2 4 Other facts may be
20' As noted supra, text accompanying notes 130-203, the traditional model of adjudication
assumes that ensuring the presence of an injury will advance satisfaction of these needs.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Supreme
Court was presented with the question of whether a finding of de jure segregation, or legally
sanctioned racial discrimination, which was common in southern states prior to issuance of the
decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), would also be required in northern
cities, where school segregation tended to result more from de facto causes, such as segregated
residential patterns, than from official legal policies. Prior to Keyes, civil rights lawyers had con-
sistently argued that de facto segregation was sufficient to trigger the remedial measures author-
ized in Brown. See D. BELL, supra note 58, at 393 n.20. In Keyes, however, the Court held that
the requirement to desegregate schools extended only to those portions of a school system in which
existing segregation was the product of intentional state action. See 413 U.S. at 198-213. This
holding was reaffirmed in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) where the Court refused to
include suburban school districts in a desegregation order because no intentional policy of racial
segregation had been proved with respect to those schools. Id. at 744-47.
For an illuminating discussion of the development of law relating to school desegregation, see
D. BELL, supra note 58, at 364-473.
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relevant, with their ultimate significance dependent upon the way the
court subsequently refines the principle. For a time, the de jure or de
facto nature of segregation was only an arguably relevant fact; it might
or might not have had some effect on proper application of the equal
protection principle.2 5 In its successive adjudications, knowledge of ar-
guably relevant facts would aid a court in determining whether those
facts should be made relevant. In addition, facts that are legally irrele-
vant under the traditional model of adjudication, such as the desires of
nonlitigant members of the community concerning desegregation, would
be useful in providing the court with information about the degree of
popular resistance likely to accompany various dispositions."' A well-
developed context makes the court's job easier, permits narrow exposi-
tion to occur, and reduces the likelihood that judicial determinations
subsequently will be abandoned because of unanticipated difficulties.
The standing and ripeness concepts, albeit somewhat modified, are
well-suited to ensure an acceptable context for adjudication. Standing
can be viewed as requiring the presence of a plaintiff who brings before
the court a factual situation which establishes the context necessary for
exposition and for fashioning the appropriate scope of relief.2 67 Al-
though considerations relating to relief are more pertinent to jus-
ticiability under the dispute-resolution model, they do serve a useful
function under the expository model by ensuring that principles are
expounded in a way that permits them to be incorporated into societal
conduct. Ripeness requirements can improve context by assuring that
the positions of the parties have become sufficiently crystallized to sup-
ply the court with useful facts.268 For example, if the constitutionality
of a municipality's busing plan is challenged, the court may encounter
difficulty in ruling on the plan until the municipality has made certain
important decisions about how the plan will operate, such as whether
busing will be voluntary or mandatory. In the absence of such deci-
sions, it may make sense to conclude that a suit is not sufficiently ripe
to serve as a basis for exposition. The context aspect of justiciability is
likely to be better understood and better served if it is addressed di-
rectly-as is natural under the expository model-rather than through
the intermediary of injury-as is required under the traditional
2" See D. BELL, supra note 58, at 389-97.
2" Arguably, such factors should play no role in adjudication under the traditional model.
Realistically, however, they must play a role in order to ensure continued popular acceptance of
judicial decrees. Cf. id. at 402.
'67 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-23 (1974);
see also A. BICKEL, supra note 74, at 115-16.
I" See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163-66 (1967).
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model."8 9
b. Adversary Presentation
The quality of judicial exposition is also aided by the adversarial
participation of the parties. Through vigorous advocacy each party
helps the court to perceive and to respond properly to weaknesses in the
presentations made by the other parties. In addition, vigorous advocacy
can illuminate facets of a case that are not immediately apparent and
might not otherwise be considered by the court.27' These benefits of
vigorous advocacy serve as the foundation of the adversarial system, and
appear to be deeply and permanently rooted in our legal system. The
likelihood that a party's advocacy will be sufficiently vigorous has tradi-
tionally been thought to vary with the party's stake in the outcome.
Accordingly, traditional rules of standing, ripeness and mootness re-
quire plaintiffs to suffer ongoing injuries in the belief that only injury
will adequately assure the personal stake necessary for vigorous
advocacy.
271
This assumption is of doubtful validity for a variety of reasons.
Because lawyers do the advocating, the status of the plaintiff is only
remotely relevant to the vigor of the advocacy that will be displayed to
the court.272 Moreover, it would appear that the willingness of a plain-
tiff voluntarily to undergo the expense and inconvenience of litigation
should itself provide adequate assurance of vigorous advocacy. 278 Fur-
ther, because most significant constitutional litigation entails many fea-
tures of public actions, the requirement of an injured plaintiff is proba-
2" The injury requirement reflects the importance of a well-developed context more by coin-
cidence than by design. See supra text accompanying notes 130-203.
270 See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1980); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-
97, 99 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146,
157 (1961).
71 See cases cited supra note 270.
"2 The decision of the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972),
seems to belie any controlling concern with the quality of a litigant's presentation to the court.
There, in an environmental case, the Court denied standing to a nationally recognized organiza-
tion with legal expertise in environmental matters, but articulated a standing test that would have
permitted a backwoods hermit, who had never seen the inside of a courthouse, to maintain the
action, and presumably to do so pro se. Id. at 734-41.
It is true that the client does hire the lawyer, and the client decides how much money will be
devoted to the case. The pertinent justiciability rules, however, do not disqualify indigent plaintiffs
or parties represented by only marginally competent attorneys. In fact, all parties have the consti-
tutional right to represent themselves-at least in criminal cases, see Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975)-and this right could seriously defeat the objective of ensuring competent
advocacy.
"3 Cf Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideo-
logical Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1037-38 (1968); Scott, supra note 156, at 673-74.
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bly counter-productive. It is very likely that the quality of advocacy in
public actions, where interest groups competently assert their own spe-
cial interests, is higher than the quality of advocacy in the average pri-
vate suit where the plaintiff satisfies traditional requirements of partic-
ularized injury.' 7
The traditional prohibition on the adjudication of collusive suits is
also rooted in the desire to secure vigorous advocacy.275 Collusive suits
are objectionable because they are conceived of as not presenting the
desired adversary clash.2 76 This conception may be accurate when op-
posing parties actually desire the same result,2 " but is less likely to be
the case when the parties genuinely desire some, but not the same, reso-
lution of the issue, even though they agree to abide by the results of a
test case.278
Although emphasis on injury or collusion in order to implement
adversarial presentation may be somewhat artificial, the objective of as-
suring vigorous advocacy is legitimate as long as the judiciary continues
to operate within the confines of the adversarial system. Again, the
traditional model requires this objective to be pursued through the in-
termediary of injury, but it can be better pursued directly, within the
context of the expository model. If, for whatever reason, it appears that
"4 See supra note 272; see also Albert, supra note 226, at 487.
25 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304-05 (1943).
276 Id.
277 Theoretically, justiciability problems are posed when a party such as a government
agency desires to comply with the demands of its opponent in litigation, but suits arising out of
such circumstances are not typically deemed collusive. For example, in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375 (1980), the Consumer Product Safety Commission desired to
release to the plaintiff consumer organizations documents that the plaintiffs had requested under
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The documents pertained to television-
related accidents. The Commission could not legally release the documents because the television
manufacturers who had submitted them to the agency had obtained an injunction prohibiting their
release. See 445 U.S. at 376-82. In a suit filed by the consumer groups against the Commission to
compel disclosure, the Supreme Court held that the action was not rendered nonjusticiable by the
fact that both parties desired the same result. Id. at 382-83.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has not treated cases as nonjusticiable simply because a govern-
mental party to the suit confesses error on appeal. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58-59
(1968). Similar problems were posed in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.
1980), afTd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), when the Reagan Administration changed its position during
litigation involving the constitutionality of Internal Revenue Service regulations denying tax ex-
emptions to private schools that engaged in racially discriminatory activities. After the Administra-
tion declined to support the validity of the regulations, the Supreme Court appointed private coun-
sel to argue in favor of the validity of the regulations. See 102 S. Ct. 1965 (1982).
"0 In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982), a damage action filed against former
President Nixon alleging that Nixon was responsible for the unconstitutional discharge of the
plaintiff after the plaintiff had publicized cost overruns in connection with a series of Air Force
contracts, it was revealed that the plaintiff and Nixon had settled the case, with the terms of the
settlement contingent upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in connection with one of the issues in
the case. The Court held that the settlement did not render the case moot, and therefore nonjusti-
ciable, because the agreement between the parties left Nixon and Fitzgerald "with a considerable
financial stake in the resolution of the question presented in this Court." Id. at 2699.
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a party or a party's attorney is an inadequate representative of the in-
terest asserted in a suit, the justiciability rules should permit the court
to take appropriate remedial steps, including dismissal of the action, in
order to avoid the consequences of poorly considered exposition.1
7'
Whether such remedial action is taken in the name of standing, ripe-
ness, mootness, collusive suit or some other doctrine, it is important that
adversariness be divorced from the concept of injury. The injury re-
quirement under the traditional model only indirectly addresses the
need for adversarial advocacy in a system of judicial exposition. Under
the expository model, adversariness and vigorous advocacy can be
placed directly at issue in making justiciability determinations.
c. Necessity
Even when context and adversary-presentation safeguards are im-
plemented through properly applied justiciability rules, erroneous adju-
dication is still a possibility. There is always some danger that a court
will expound a principle in a way that later is abandoned due to inade-
quate initial consideration or to the occurrence of an unanticipated
change in circumstances.""0 On a more subtle level, there is also a
danger of imprudent exposition; in important cases the court runs the
risk of issuing a particular exposition of a principle before its time 81 or
of being seduced into "legitimating" 282 conduct that is not genuinely
warranted by the principle at issue. Erroneous or imprudent adjudica-
tion may well produce unfortunate consequences and threaten institu-
tional legitimacy when the improper adjudication is ultimately rectified.
Accordingly, there is much to be said for exercising the power of adju-
dication with restraint; a case should be adjudicated only when
"necessary. "283
"Necessary" means simply that the benefits of exposition outweigh
"' Federal courts are required to make similar determinations in ruling upon whether an
action properly may proceed as a class action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
280 For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Supreme Court held that
separate-but-equal treatment of races did not offend the Constitution. This exposition of the perti-
nent constitutional provisions was later abandoned in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which generally prohibited legislative dassifi-
cations based on race.
28 Arguably, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was decided prematurely. If
this were the case, it would help to explain the Court's questionable actions in Naim v. Naim, 350
U.S. 891 (1955), and 350 U.S. 985 (1956), see supra note 74. It might also explain the degree of
persistence that has accompanied opposition to busing as a means of implementing Brown. See
supra note 58.
2 Perhaps Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) "legitimated" separate-but-equal treat-
ment of the races because of practical, social exigencies, even though the Constitution did not
"truly" tolerate such treatment. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 64, at 29, 70-71, 129, 197.
2" Cf Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974).
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the dangers, in whatever manner the benefits and dangers are measured
by the court. The concept of necessity as a component of justiciability
finds some recognition in traditional standing, ripeness and mootness
decisions.'" Again, however, necessity has been measured in terms of
injury. Those decisions assert the general proposition that judicial in-
tervention is unnecessary if some eventuality may eliminate the plain-
tiff's injury in the absence of a remedial judgment.' " Thus, if the de-
fendant has already provided what the plaintiff seeks, the action is
moot;288 if the defendant may yet meet the plaintiff's demands the ac-
tion is not yet ripe;287 and if the defendant may lawfully avoid the
plaintiff's desires even in the face of a judgment rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, the plaintiff lacks standing due to a failure of
redressability.
28 8
The dangers of erroneous or imprudent adjudication warrant a ne-
cessity component of justiciability. Necessity determinations, however,
should be made in a more sophisticated manner than they have been
under present doctrines. " 9 Calculation of whether judicial intervention
is warranted will frequently be quite difficult, especially in public ac-
tions where both the benefits and dangers of exposition are very high.
In Brown v. Board of Education,2 0  the Supreme Court determined
that the benefits of judicial intervention outweighed the attendant
problems. A year later in Naim v. Naim,2" 1 however, the same Court
See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-43 (1976) (stand-
ing); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974) (standing);
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam) (mootness); United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947) (ripeness); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
240-41 (1937) (ripeness); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 115-16 (1920)
(mootness).
, See cases cited supra note 284.
" See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam); United States v.
Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 115-16 (1920).
"7 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
'" See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-43 (1976); Schles-
inger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974).
" On occasion, the Supreme Court's "necessity" determinations appear to be somewhat
sophomoric. For example, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59
(1978), Justice Stevens accused the majority of sidestepping a host of jurisdictional and jus-
ticiability problems in order to resolve definitively legal questions that, if left in their then-present
state of resolution, might have had the arguably undesirable effect of impeding the development of
nuclear power. See id. at 102-03 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). After reading the
majority opinion, one is left with the impression that the Court would not have reached the merits
of the case if the lower court had not done so, or if the lower court had issued a pronuclear
decision. Many of the Supreme Court's "necessity" determinations seem to have been little more
than result oriented manipulation of the applicable justiciability doctrines. See supra note 128. On
other occasions, the Supreme Court's necessity determinations appear to have been more delicate
and well-considered. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 74.
2- 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See supra note 74.
1 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam); 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam).
1983]
654 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:585
determined that the problems likely to be precipitated by judicial inter-
vention outweighed the benefits, even though the same legal principle
was at issue.292 When such delicate balancing is involved, adherence to
artificial visions of injury, which can obscure rather than illuminate the
truly pivotal factors, adversely affects the court's determination.
Some of the presently used component doctrines of standing can be
viewed as responses to necessity concerns, 93 although they rarely are
presented in such terms. For example, the general prohibition on third-
party standing to assert the rights of others9 may simply reflect a sus-
picion that if the injured parties do not care enough to file suit them-
selves, then the need for judicial relief is not acute enough to warrant
risking the dangers of exposition. The exceptions to the third-party
standing prohibition, which generally apply when the injured parties
face some legal or practical impediments to filing suit,2 "' are consistent
with this view. When such impediments exist, failure of the injured
parties to file suit is no longer an accurate barometer of the need for
judicial intervention and is not, therefore, properly treated as one.
The rules governing representational or associational standing can
be understood as being directed at a special case of third-party stand-
ing. Where many individuals suffer the same small injury, their collec-
tive desire for judicial intervention, evidenced by their authorization of
a representational suit filed on their behalf, may provide a more mean-
ingful measure of necessity than that provided by the failure of any
individual to file suit. Accordingly, rules for representational and asso-
ciational standing tend to focus on whether an associational plaintiff
genuinely represents the views of its constituents.2 96
l See supra note 74.
US See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
"Ordinarily, one may not claim standing . . . to vindicate the constitutional rights of
some third party." Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953); see also Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). See generally Note, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
... A student commentator has identified three considerations-in addition to a more general
exception for overbreadth claims-that may prompt a court to dispense with the customary prohi-
bition on third-party standing. See Note, supra note 294, at 423-28. Those considerations are: (1)
the presence of a substantial relationship between the plaintiff and the third party whose rights
are being asserted; (2) the impossibility of the third party's assertion of his or her own rights; and
(3) the need to avoid dilution of the third party's rights that would result from adherence to the
customary prohibition. See id. at 425. The presence of any or all of those considerations suggests
that basing necessity determinations solely on the actions or inactions of a third party would be
imprudent.
SM The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the standing of voluntary membership
organizations to assert the rights of their members, even when the organizations themselves suf-
fered no injury. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975); see also Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977). In Hunt, the Court recognized
three "prerequisites" to establishing an organization's standing to maintain suit on behalf of its
members:
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Congressional standing poses a related but more complicated prob-
lem. Frequently, the interest asserted by a congressional plaintiff will
not only fail to serve as an accurate barometer of the need for judicial
intervention, but the congressional plaintiff will arguably be urging the
court to engage in nonjudicial behavior that is inconsistent with separa-
tion-of-powers concerns.2"'
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose;
and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation
of individual members in the lawsuit.
432 U.S. at 343. Hunt also extended standing to sue in a representative capacity to nonmember-
ship organizations as long as those organizations, nevertheless, possessed the "indicia of member-
ship." See id. at 344-45. Presumably, when the "indicia of membership" are present, the "mem-
bers" have sufficient control over the operation of the representational plaintiff to warrant the
inference that judicial intervention is "necessary." Cf Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82
F.R.D. 21, 23-28 (D.D.C. 1979).
29 The Supreme Court has been conspicuously absent in the development of congressional-
standing law, but the District of Columbia Circuit has been quite active. In most respects, con-
gressional plaintiffs are treated as if they were private plaintiffs for standing purposes. In Har-
rington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court stated:
When analyzing the standing claims of a Congressman it is important to keep
in mind the nature and source of the analytical standards to be employed. The most
basic point to consider is that there are no special standards for determining- Con-
gressional standing questions. Although the interests and injuries which legislators
assert are surely different from those put forth by other litigants, the technique for
analyzing the interests is the same.
Id. at 204 (emphasis in original). Presumably, application of more lenient standing rules to con-
gressional plaintiffs would provide inaccurate necessity information to a dispute-resolution ori-
ented judiciary. Accordingly, congressional plaintiffs can secure standing by establishing injury in
fact-with the requisite likelihood of redressibility-to an interest that is arguably within the zone
of interests protected by the relevant law. See Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d
873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For example, when President Ford improperly attempted to exercise
his pocket-veto power over legislation for which Senator Kennedy had voted, the consequent nulli-
fication of the Senator's vote was viewed as constituting an injury sufficient for standing to chal-
lenge the validity of the pocket veto. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433-36 (D.C. Cir.
1974); c. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), vacated memn.,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
Because congressional plaintiffs tend to file suit in situations suggesting that they were unable
to convince their colleagues in Congress to follow a particular course of action, see Riegle, 656
F.2d at 877, it is not clear whether judicial intervention would be appropriate. The language
quoted, supra, from Harrington suggests that the political context out of which a case arises
should have no bearing on the standing issue. Nevertheless, judicial intervention could interfere
with the legislative process, thereby posing separation-of-powers problems. See Riegle, 656 F.2d
at 879. The District of Columbia Circuit appears to have approached the problem by treating the
standing and separation-of-powers issues as analytically distinct.
In Riegle, the plaintiff, a senator, challenged the composition of the Federal Open Market
Committee because some of its members, by statute, had been exempted from the process of Senate
confirmation, in alleged violation of the appointments clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2. The court held that Senator Riegle had suffered an injury sufficient to establish
standing, due to the deprivation of his opportunity to cast a confirmation vote. See 656 F.2d at
877-79. The court, however, went on to dismiss the action in its "equitable discretion," in order to
avoid interference with the legislative process. See 656 F.2d at 879-82. The court noted that af-
fected private plaintiffs would, in all likelihood be able to establish standing. See id. at 881. But
see Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (bond-
holder who was also member of House of Representatives denied standing to make same chal-
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The propriety of a federal court's declining to exercise jurisdiction
over a dispute that is sufficiently acute to be cognizable under the tradi-
tional model has sparked spirited debate. Professor Bickel has argued
that when judicial intervention would be imprudent, the court-at least
the Supreme Court-should rely on justiciability devices such as stand-
ing, ripeness and the political question doctrine to avoid adjudication on
the merits .29  He has termed those devices "passive virtues.'" 9  Profes-
sor Bickel appears to have condoned manipulation of those doctrines to
the extent necessary to preserve the institutional respect, and corre-
sponding effectiveness, of the judiciary, even if a degree of public decep-
tion were to ensue.300 Such deception would be tolerable because of the
importance of enabling the judiciary to extricate itself from troublesome
lenge). However, the court suggested that in the absence of a conceivable private plaintiff, where
legislative redress was also unlikely, it would "welcome" a congressional plaintiff in order to avoid
rendering a constitutional claim unreviewable. See R'egle, 656 F.2d at 882.
The court's opinion in Riegle may well reflect its view of the necessity of judicial intervention
in light of the competing considerations. Presumably, the court did not view separation-of-powers
concerns as a constitutional barrier to adjudicating the case; it did express a willingness to reach
the merits if a noncongressional plaintiff were to file suit. See id. at 881-82. Apparently, the court
viewed judicial intervention as unnecessary-not sufficiently weighty to overcome the separation-
of-powers concerns at issue-when the only ensuing benefit would be to permit a senator to win in
court a political battle that she or he had lost in Congress. If someone were to present the court
with a more traditionally cognizable injury, in a context that raised fewer separation-of-powers
concerns, the court's necessity calculation might have come out differently.
In McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho), afd mern., 102 S. Ct. 559 (1981), a
three-judge district court dismissed, for lack of standing, a suit filed by Senator McClure of Idaho
challenging the appointment by President Carter of Abner J. Mikva as a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Prior to his appointment, Judge
Mikva was a Member of the House of Representatives when the salaries of federal judges were
increased. Accordingly, in a suit reminiscent of Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), see supra
note 260, Senator McClure-who had voted against Senate confirmation of Judge Mikva-sued
for a declaration that Judge Mikva's appointment was constitutionally invalid as a violation of the
ineligibility clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
The court held that Senator McClure suffered no injury that would be sufficient for standing
as either a private citizen or as a senator. See 513 F. Supp. at 269-70. The court also rejected
Senator McClure's claim to standing based upon a special statute which Congress had enacted
specifically to permit congressional-plaintiff challenges to Judge Mikva's appointment. See id. at
266, 271.
The case poses separation-of-powers problems with an ironic twist. Although the court ex-
pressed reluctance to become involved in the legislative process, see id. at 271, in McClure, Con-
gress had expressly invited the court to rule on the constitutional issue. Arguably, the court vio-
lated separation-of-powers principles by supplanting its own views of expediency for a
congressionally enacted policy determination. See supra text accompanying note 243. The court
viewed it as "unnecessary" to reach the merits of the constitutional issue involved, purposefully
leaving the alleged constitutional violation unreviewable. It is difficult to find any merit in the
court's holding. See supra note 226. McClure-like Ex parte Levitt-appears to be simply a case
in which the courts have chosen not to enforce a provision of the Constitution but have avoided
explaining why. If there is some reason that-contrary to the views of the framers-the ineligibil-
ity clause is in reality undesirable, principled decisionmaking requires the courts to disclose that
reason, rather than hide behind justiciability doctrines.
2" See A. BICKEL, supra note 64, at 111-98.
9 Id.
3o See, e.g., id. at 169-97 (suggesting how a variety of cases properly could be disposed of).
But see id. at 132-33.
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cases without undermining the common perception that it remains
available to resolve disputes. 01 Arguably, an array of justiciability de-
vices is required precisely because it makes deception easier than it
would be if only a single, transparent device were available.
Professor Wechsler disagrees, arguing that the Marbury model of
judicial review obligates courts to resolve disputes that fall within their
jurisdiction, and that justiciability doctrines do not countenance discre-
tionary abstention.3 02 Professor Wechsler would, however, permit
courts to decline to reach the merits where genuine jurisdictional defects
exist.3 03 Professor Gunther shares the Wechsler view that justiciability
is not synonymous with discretion, and criticizes the Bickel position as
being fundamentally unprincipled.'" Professor Gunther, however, also
appears to recognize that in some circumstances courts will, neverthe-
less, simply refuse to exercise jurisdiction that they are, under his view,
required to exercise.305 His argument appears to be that if courts per-
ceive exigencies that will, in extraordinary circumstances, cause them to
ignore their obligation to adjudicate particular cases, then so be it.306
But such judicial "misconduct" should not be elevated to the level of a
recognized, validating doctrine.$
07
All three commentators would probably concede that in some cases
the mischief produced by a decision on the merits would outweigh the
need to protect the "rights" of the parties. Naim v. Naim08 may have
been such a case; if not, others could be imagined. It is likely that none
of the three would demand an adjudication of the merits in such cases.
They differ only in their stated response to the Court's manipulation of
a justiciability device in order to avoid a decision on the merits. Bickel
presumably would argue that such manipulation was the intended use
of technical justiciability doctrines, doctrines that the parties could not
be expected to understand. Wechsler and Gunther presumably would
rebuke the Court for misuse of the doctrine being manipulated in order
to reduce the frequency with which such judicial tactics would recur.
All three, however, would be secure in the knowledge that the system
had worked properly. Potentially disasterous adjudication of the merits
would have been avoided, while the general perception that the judici-
ary safeguards the rights of litigants would have been preserved. Only
301 See id. at 117-27.
302 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles, supra note 74, at 1-10, 34.
303 See id. at 6.
304 See Gunther, supra note 74.
303 See id. at 12.
306 See id. at 12-13.
307 See id.
350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam); 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam).
1983]
658 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:585
the rights of the parties immediately before the court would have been
sacrificed in order to save the system.
Judicial abstention is the inevitable end result of a confrontation
between the needs of the parties and weightier needs of society as a
whole, and such abstention is not necessarily improper. It is not clear,
however, that so much deception is necessary. Bickel's "passive vir-
tues" are useful primarily because few people will understand them,3
thereby permitting the court to feign fidelity to a principle other than
the principle actually being applied-the principle that sometimes the
need to enforce the rights of the parties can be outweighed by societal
needs. The Wechsler and Gunther position seems even more deceptive;
it asserts that a particular type of judicial disposition is improper, while
recognizing that it is necessary; it argues that such a disposition should
not be repeated in the future, while knowing that occasions will arise in
which it must. All of this deception is a necessary outgrowth of the
dispute-resolution model, which dictates that protection of rights is the
only legitimate function of adjudication.
The expository model recognizes that dispute resolution, and its
ensuing protection of rights, is not the primary function of article III
adjudication. Rather resolving disputes is incidental to the function of
ensuring that society's principles develop properly. Therefore, the ex-
pository model permits courts to decline to adjudicate the merits-to
decline to expound principles-if the circumstances would render the
risks of erroneous or imprudent exposition unacceptably high. If reach-
ing the merits in Naim v. Naim is likely to frustrate rather than facili-
tate proper development of the equal-protection principle with respect
to race relations, the court has not only the authority but the duty to
avoid adjudication of that principle. Honest exposition of the principle
could cause loss of the popular support necessary for the court to per-
form its long term expository function. Dishonest exposition would
confuse the meaning of the principle, and, if detected, would result in
the loss of perceived legitimacy. Thus, the expository model does not
change the present judicial practice of sidestepping the merits of troub-
lesome constitutional questions; it merely recognizes that practice as a
legitimate one.
' Although Professor Bickel has offered intelligible explanations for why the use of one
particular "passive virtue" is more appropriate in particular circumstances than the use of an-
other, see A. BICKEL, supra note 64, at 133-97, it is unlikely that his subtle distinctions could be
generally understood by the populace. This is probably true of most uses of most justiciability
doctrines, and perhaps of most other legal doctrines as well. The population comes to understand
a court's application of a principle as news reporters and legal commentators translate judicial
concepts and language into more commonly understood terms. Judicial opinions, of course, lose
something in the translation, and extremely subtle ideas are likely to be completely lost.
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The expository model also has implications for what the parties
and interested observers should be told when a court declines to reach
the merits. They should be told the truth. The expository model is pre-
mised upon the belief that the judiciary propels society forward by
making complex, aspirational principles understandable and concrete.
It follows, therefore, that the principle that all rights cannot be safe-
guarded in all cases should come to be societally recognized. The judici-
ary is the institution that can best explain the principle, and exposition
in the context of particular cases is the process by which it should be
explained. Accordingly, if Naim v. Naim were determined to be a case
in which the court could justifiably abandon the rights of the parties for
the greater social good, the court's opinion should state:
The court declines to consider what meaning the principle of
equal protection has in the present context. In light of the
extraordinary sensitivity of the constitutional issue presented,
and the likely inability of the court to issue an opinion that
would be properly understood and implemented into conduct
at the present time, the court declines to reach the merits.
The needs of the parties for judicial resolution of their dis-
pute do not offset the dangers to proper performance of the
court's expository function that could result from an adjudi-
cation on the merits.
The opinion should then go on to discuss the respective needs and dan-
gers with a degree of specificity sufficient to make the opinion
convincing.
Although a necessity doctrine would permit a court to decline to
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases even though no traditional jus-
ticiability defects were present, such a doctrine should not be viewed as
embodying the general discretion to flee from difficult cases. On the
contrary, it is likely that such a doctrine would rarely be invoked, be-
cause the expository function itself would temper judicial use of the
necessity doctrine. As noted above, in order to reduce principles to a
comprehensible, operational level in an effective manner, the judiciary
requires a great deal of esteem. 10 That esteem would be undermined if
the judiciary were perceived to be "ducking" difficult or controversial
issues without sufficient reason. Accordingly, the necessity doctrine
could be invoked effectively only where its invocation could be accepta-
bly explained. As a practical matter, that would rarely be the case, and
recognition of a necessity doctrine would not increase the incidence of
SIo See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
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judicial abstention. A necessity doctrine would not be easy to apply, but
it would have the advantage of permitting direct and explicit balancing
of competing considerations in a way that would promote public scru-
tiny rather than public deception. More important, it would serve an
expository function by increasing society's understanding of one of its
important principles-the principle that the judiciary exists to oversee
the development of our fundamental values.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed the ways in which justiciability doc-
trines should be applied, emphasizing the desirability of focusing on the
functions that those doctrines properly should serve. Some of the sug-
gested applications correspond to present applications of justiciability
doctrines, while others are directly at odds with current practices. It is
possible that the law of justiciability is in such disarray that it cannot
be salvaged without abandoning the present doctrinal terminology and
its accompanying confusion. Perhaps it would be best for courts to stop
speaking in terms of standing or ripeness, and to begin speaking in
terms of context or separation of powers. However, questions of doctri-
nal nomenclature are relatively unimportant; they neither create nor
defeat coherence. What is important is that courts genuinely pursue
sensible objectives. But those objectives must be understood before they
can be pursued.
It is no longer plausible to maintain that the objective of article III
adjudication is to resolve disputes or to redress injuries. Bare dispute-
resolution does not accurately describe what courts do or what society
desires them to do. Moreover, the chimerical quality of injury renders
its redress too elusive to serve as a meaningful objective. The injury-
orientation that characterizes present justiciability rules is at best an
anachronism. Although it may have originally been formulated to facil-
itate proper understanding of the judicial function, it is now relied
upon in lieu of understanding. The most important function of the judi-
ciary is to give meaning to the law. When legislative policies are at
issue, such exposition facilitates proper operation of the legislative pro-
cess in a manner consistent with separation of powers. When funda-
mental principles are involved, exposition affects society's understand-
ing and implementation of those principles in a way that facilitates
social progress.
The concept of justiciability and its various component doctrines
can usefully be understood as reflecting a concern with confining the
judiciary to proper judicial activity. The injury-orientation of present
justiciability rules, however, has caused those rules to perform this
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function poorly, because the presence or absence of a traditional injury
has little bearing on the limitations that properly should govern the
process of exposition. As expository institutions, federal courts should
primarily be concerned with avoiding the exercise of legislative poli-
cymaking functions and with avoiding adjudication under circumstances
in which the dangers of exposition are likely to outweigh the benefits.
Justiciability determinations should, therefore, focus upon ensuring the
proper separation of powers, and upon ensuring adjudication in a well-
developed context, with adversarial presentation of the issues, where
the need to adjudicate those issues is not outweighed by the overall
needs of the expository justice system. These objectives are more likely
to be realized if pursued directly, with an appreciation for the exposi-
tory function of adjudication, than through reliance on a nonviable con-
cept of injury. Realistically, the federal courts cannot be expected to
perform their social function better until they better understand it.

